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 Abstract 
This thesis addresses New Orleans’ “Bio-Med” sector, a broad category that includes biosciences 
research, health care, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturing.  
Biotechnology, in particular, has emerged as an attractive target for economic development in 
New Orleans, in Louisiana, and in the nation as a whole.  Informed by economic geography and 
development literature, this research presents a narrative of efforts to foster the Bio-Med 
industries in New Orleans as a source of economic diversification and employment.  Structural 
economic conditions, as well as a complex and unsettled array of political agendas shaping Bio-
Med institutions, underscore a pessimistic view of the potential for biotechnology to generate 
significant economic impacts.  Since Katrina exacerbated these conditions, Bio-Med strategies 
should direct more attention to the health care industry and specifically to addressing workforce 
gaps to meet the twin goals of expanding health coverage and providing realistic employment 
opportunities for underserved populations.
 vi 
 I. Introduction and Definitions 
 Economic decline has marked New Orleans since the mid-1980s oil price collapse 
initiated massive job loss and downtown decline.  Even before such dramatic local recession, 
economic development and metropolitan governance proceeded along a path marked by 
“fragmentation” (Lauria et al. 1995, 106).  After the bottom fell out of New Orleans’ over-
dependence on the oil and gas industries, city officials and private developers increasingly 
sought to draw on the city’s historically rich tourism industry as an economic development 
strategy; and tourism has indeed proven vital to the city’s rebound in terms of both downtown 
redevelopment and employment (Lauria et al. 1995).  However, tourism’s success – almost 
axiomatically – has fostered problematic path dependence.  Tourism has reshaped downtown to 
house primarily tourist uses along the riverfront while other areas have declined; and the city’s 
workforce occupies a plurality of relatively low-paying, insecure jobs in the tourism and 
hospitality industries, where few opportunities exist for advancement.  By the early 1990s, 
however, state and local economic development agencies had initiated a focus on the 
biotechnology and biosciences sector as a new engine for economic growth and downtown 
development. 
 At least, that was the situation before August 29th, 2005.  On that date, Hurricane Katrina 
sacked New Orleans with massive flood damage, violence, and confusion during its disastrous 
aftermath.  As with nearly every aspect of life in the city, Katrina dramatically altered the 
structures underlying economic development, as the wholesale destruction of New Orleans’ 
essential infrastructure, housing, and labor force – as well as the nationwide perception of 
bumbling city and state leadership amidst federal neglect – pose an almost impossibly daunting 
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deterrent to future capital investment.  In the months following the disaster several plans 
emerged, both to guide comprehensive rebuilding strategies and to present a unified front to 
congressional funding measures.  In particular, early economic development frameworks 
produced by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), Louisiana Recovery Authority 
(LRA), and the Urban Land Institute sought to foster the tourism and cultural sector as the 
quickest path to immediate recovery but advanced the biosciences and health care sectors as the 
most likely source of long-term economic diversification and sustainability.  Over the course of 
an unprecedented mayoral race in the ensuing months, major candidates ubiquitously paid 
frequent lip service to these industries as factors in both health care reconstruction and economic 
diversification schemes.  At the time of this writing over one year after the hurricane, this focus 
is gaining traction as early policy frameworks crystallize into more formal plans.  Meanwhile, 
outside of New Orleans, nurturing local biotechnology and biosciences industries has coalesced 
into a national trend in recent years, owing mainly to the attractive level of investment and the 
high quality of employment involved, in addition to potential spin-off jobs.  
 And yet, many uncertainties remain.  This thesis attempts to situate biotechnology and 
biosciences strategies in the New Orleans Region within a broader framework, first within the 
context of existing literature on the subject and then within in the complex, multifaceted political 
economies governing the implementation of such an exceptionally interdisciplinary economic 
project.  The opening chapter defines several terms relating to the range of “Bio-Med” industries, 
an inclusive category into which a broad group of activities taking place in New Orleans have 
been condensed (BNOB 2006).  In the literature review chapter (Ch.2), the first section draws 
from a cursory review of extensive literature on regional innovation systems – or industrial 
“clusters” – to sketch out an account of how economic development policies recently have 
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attempted to shape their constituent regions into loci for internationally competitive, knowledge-
intensive, high-technology industries.  The review sheds light on the locally “embedded” 
qualities of the economic geographies into which high-technology industries situate themselves 
and comments on how academic knowledge on clusters filters down to the policymakers who 
attempt to foster cluster development.  The second half of Chapter 2 hones in specifically on 
biotechnology and how the industry has concentrated into a select few regions over the course of 
its relatively short history.  Out of the case studies presented, several common characteristics and 
strategies emerge as necessary to support a successful biotech cluster, including economic 
diversity, a local capacity for entrepreneurialism, a skilled industry-relevant workforce, a 
prestigious research university, and an active leadership structure.  The third and longest chapter 
treats New Orleans’ attempt to cultivate a biotechnology industry out of its strengths in medical 
research.  As narrated in this thesis, biotechnology and biosciences initiatives proceeded slowly 
before Hurricane Katrina, although the state had enacted several noteworthy initiatives in recent 
years.  Since Katrina, a new political economy focused on recovery and directed by a complex 
web of federal, state, and local influences is in the process of hashing out several long-term 
reforms and structural changes in the Bio-Med industries.  These changes will undoubtedly 
impact current attempts to reconstruct the Bio-Med industry in general and, more specifically, to 
build on pre-Katrina initiatives. 
 This thesis argues for tempered optimism regarding the potential for biotechnology to 
serve as a substantial economic base in the New Orleans Region, even before the challenges 
posed by the current post-disaster environment.  However, several proposed reforms in the 
regional health care system could underlie substantial changes in the role of health care in the 
regional economy, especially with greater coordination of policy agendas largely fragmented 
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between industries and scales of governance.  Ultimately, health care industrial and occupational 
strategies may provide a more realistic source of regional economic growth, potentially 
generating wide-ranging benefits for workers at a diverse range of skill levels.   
 The Bio-Med industry is, by nature, interdisciplinary.  It encompasses university 
“biosciences” research, entrepreneurial commercialization of high-tech research 
(“biotechnology”), and the delivery of health services (the health care industry).  As such, this 
thesis has attempted to paint a holistic picture by remaining conscious of the contextual 
differences among the various fields involved.  In addition, policies and plans generated on a 
variety of scales of governance shape the Bio-Med industries in New Orleans.  The account 
presented here focuses on the region as the unit of analysis but also considers state-level policies 
as they pertain to New Orleans.  Of necessity, the research draws from a variety of sources.  
Most descriptions of Bio-Med industries and strategies are derived from secondary sources and 
government documents.  Media publications, attendance at public meetings, and information and 
conversations stemming from the author’s personal (if relatively brief) employment in the field 
of public health have provided additional sources.    
 
 
Defining the Bio-Med Industry 
 Fostering the Bio-Med sector has long served as a goal for New Orleans’ universities, 
hospitals, economic development professionals, and government.  Likewise, in the uncertain 
post-Katrina landscape, this sector remains explicitly targeted for growth efforts:  “The 
devastation of the Bio-Med base in the New Orleans metro area threatens to kill the goose that 
lays the golden egg” (BNOB 2005, 45).  But what sort of economic activity constitutes this Bio-
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Med sector?  In other words, to examine the existing and prospective linkages and functions 
encompassed within the Bio-Med sector, the term “biomedical” first must be defined, along with 
various related categories like biotechnology, health care, health services, medical devices and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, and life sciences research and development.  This section 
considers definitions to the “Bio-med” base articulated in strategic documents for New Orleans 
and compares these terms with standard industry definitions among technical and academic 
analyses.   
 The Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), a mayoral group that created the 
highest-profile initial local policy framework after Katrina, specifically treats the “Bio-Med” 
industry in its economic development plan.  The authors of this plan employ the abbreviated term 
Bio-Med simultaneously as inclusive of several medical-related activities and as synonymous 
with the health care industry:  “This plan covers the broadly classified ‘Bio-Med’ or health care 
industry which includes five categories under the US Census Bureau North American Industry 
Classification (NAICS) codes:  health care services, health care insurance, life sciences R&D, 
medical devices and pharmaceuticals” (BNOB 2006, 31).  This definition echoes pre-Katrina 
economic development language.  Specifically, in 1991, the state legislature created the New 
Orleans Biomedical Research and Development Park (BRDP), an organizational unit designed to 
foster the potential of the downtown medical cluster as an economic development district.  As an 
organizational unit, this district’s membership and geographical boundaries essentially mirror 
those of the New Orleans Medical Complex (NOrMC), a non-profit organization whose mission 
is to enhance the image and development of the regional medical center located in the Park. 
From these labels, it may be concluded that, in New Orleans, the term “biomedical” (or 
“Bio-Med”) has taken on an inclusive and often nebulous meaning as a targeted growth sector 
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for at least the last 15 years.  Likewise, for the purposes of this thesis, the term Bio-Med will 
refer to an inclusive grouping of related activities as listed above.  However, breaking down this 
broad category is necessary to disentangle the relationship between the bifurcated social roles of 
the Bio-Med industry, which provides both an economic development engine and an essential 
health care infrastructure.  The respective policy priorities and planning competencies involved 
with supporting each of these roles fundamentally differ.  For example, while a health care plan 
might point to a nurses training program as enhancing capacity and quality in the health care 
delivery system, an economic development plan might cite the same program as a workforce 
investment.  Obviously, these goals can and frequently do intersect very closely, but their 
conflated representation has marked New Orleans’ approach with a measure of vagueness that 
serves as a suitable entry point to critical analysis. 
This thesis will examine how health care and economic development policy priorities 
intersect and diverge in the post-Katrina landscape.  First, however, an exploration of the specific 
components of the Bio-Med sector, particularly in light of the academic and professional 
literature’s definition of these categories, informs analytical assumptions regarding the industry 
as an economic development project.  Included within the relatively broad conception of Bio-
Med activity in New Orleans, biotechnology stands out as a burgeoning industrial category, apart 
from the older but related functions of hospitals and universities.  Generally, biotechnology may 
be considered emblematic of the “new economy,” in that the industry has come of age in the past 
20 years, depends critically on knowledge as opposed to natural resources, and employs a highly 
skilled workforce (Fitzgerald 2006, 114-115).  Unmatched for research intensiveness, the U.S. 
biotechnology industry spends over $9 billion in R&D annually (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 53).   
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Cortright and Mayer (2002, 37-39) discuss at length how the biotechnology industry is 
defined by itself and by the academics who study it.  Table 1 reports Cortright and Mayer’s work 
on assembling industry definitions, along with selected other relevant categories put forth in New 
Orleans-specific policies documents.  While neither old Standard Industrial Classification codes 
(SIC) nor the new North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) neatly categorize 
the biotechnology industry, the Biotechnology Industry Organization and Ernst and Young, who 
maintain two of the most widely recognized counts of biotechnology firms, generally define 
“biotechnology” as “the application of biological knowledge and techniques to develop products 
and services” (Cortright and Mayer 2002, 37).  The “biotechnology industry,” then, includes 
firms established to develop this knowledge and to exploit it commercially (6).  Mainly, this field 
utilizes molecular, cellular, and genetic processes that can be applied to a wide range of 
activities, including agriculture and manufacturing.  In the majority of cases, though, 
biotechnology applications involve medicine and health.  While some other industry groups and 
academic observers differentiate between biotechnology and pharmaceutical production and 
manufacturing, their definitions regarding what constitutes biotech-related activity remain 
broadly congruent (38).  As listed above, according to the categories explicitly situated within 
the Bio-Med sector by the BNOB plan, biotechnology firms most closely fall under “life 
sciences R&D,” with the important distinction that biotech workers create knowledge for 
entrepreneurial commercial development (or “applied” research) in contrast with the academic 
research carried out at a university (or “basic” research). 
Fitzgerald relates biotechnology to a broad industrial grouping that includes 
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices (“biomanufacturing”), all of which 
otherwise have been combined into a “biopharmaceutical” category of industries (Fitzgerald  
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Table 1.  Selected Biosciences, Biotechnology, and Life Sciences Definitions 
 
 Term Source Definition 
Biotechnology* Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization, Ernst 
and Young 
The application of biological knowledge and 
techniques to develop products and services 
Biotechnology* Institute for 
Biotechnology 
Information 
Firms founded to use new technologies as the 
basis of the R&D or manufacturing efforts 
(differentiates between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms) 
Biotechnology * Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers Moneytree 
Developers of technology promoting drug 
development, disease treatment, and a deeper 
understanding of living organisms, including 
biochemicals, cell therapy, genetic engineering 
systems, drug delivery, and pharmaceuticals 
(treats medical devices, health care services, and 
medical information systems as separate 
industries) 
Biotechnology* Standard and 
Poor’s 2000 
No specific definition (treats pharmaceutical 
firms separately) 
In
du
st
ry
 D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
Bio-
pharmaceutical 
Milken Institute 
2004 
No specific definition (includes pharmaceutical 
and medical device manufacturing and 
biotechnology) 
Biotechnology* Goetz and Morgan 
1995 
Any technique that uses living organisms or parts 
of organisms to make/modify products, improve 
plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for 
specific use 
Biotechnology* Hall and Bagchi-
Sen 2001 
Products and Processes for the diagnosis, 
treatment, and cure of human disease, as well as 
the development of genetically customized 
animals, plants, and food 
Biotechnology* Paugh and 
LaFrance 1997 
A set of techniques that use organisms or their 
cellular, subcellular, or molecular components to 
make products or modify plants, animals, and 
micro-organisms to carry desired traits 
Biotechnology* Gray and Parker 
1998 
No definition (distinguishes between 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals) 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
Bio-
manufacturing 
Fitzgerald 2006 The portion of the biotechnology industry 
engaged specifically in manufacturing processes 
(distinguishes between biotech, pharmaceuticals, 
and medical device manufacturing) 
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 Table 1.  Continued  
  
 Term Source Definition 
Bio-Med or 
health care 
industry 
Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission:  
Economic 
Redevelopment Plan 
2006 
No specific definitions (encompasses health care 
services, health care insurance, life sciences 
R&D, medical devices, and pharmaceutical; 
pharmaceuticals includes the biotechnology 
industry) 
Biotechnology Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission:  
Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005 
The use of cellular and molecular processes to 
solve problems or make products, and 
biotechnology firms use cells and biological 
molecules for applications in medicine, 
agriculture, and environmental management 
(differentiates between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, contract research 
organizations, and equipment manufacturers) 
Life Sciences Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission:  
Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005 
Life sciences firms include those that design and 
produce medical devices and instruments and 
pharmaceutical companies, and in some cases 
may include medical labs, hospitals, and medical 
centers 
N
ew
 O
rle
an
s P
ol
ic
y 
D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
Biosciences Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission:  
Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005 
Incorporates life sciences and biotechnology, as 
well as agricultural chemicals and research and 
testing 
 
SOURCES:  Cortright and Mayer 2002(*), BRDP 2002, BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 
BNOB 2006, Milken Institute 2004, Fitzgerald 2006. 
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2006, 114; cf. Milken Institute 2004).  Relatively recently, traditional pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have explored linkages with newer, smaller, and more entrepreneurial biotech 
firms.  Indeed, many biotech and biomanufacturing firms share knowledge, access to capital, 
support services, and amenities, reinforcing a widely observed tendency for such firms to 
concentrate spatially.  In 2003, the biotech industry employed 191,000 people in 1,457 
companies nationally in relatively high-wage, high-value jobs (Fitzgerald 2006, 114).  Given the 
high rate of expected growth in these industries, regions with a strong biotech industrial cluster 
are well positioned to attract and to retain well paying jobs as the industry continues to mature.  
Consequently, nearly every state in the union counts biotechnology as an industry targeted for 
economic development. 
 While some consensus exists regarding the industry’s definition of biotechnology, the 
way in which biotechnology is defined on the state and local level often varies from place to 
place.  In almost all cases where states or localities have attempted to examine biotechnology-
related activity, the definition of biotechnology is tailored to local perceptions (Cortright and 
Mayer 2002, 39).  Almost all of these definitions include biotechnology as defined above as well 
as other activities under a wide array of other terms, including “biosciences,” “life sciences,” 
“biomedical sciences,” and “health care technology” (39).  On the one hand, most of these 
studies exist primarily to market the locality as the site of a substantial cluster of biotech and 
biotech-related activity and, as such, may be prone to inflationary definitions.  On the other hand, 
to some extent, the nature of relationships between actors in a given cluster probably varies from 
site to site.1   
                                                 
1 To illustrate, Walcott, writing separately on the Atlanta life-science (1999) industry and the San 
Diego bioscience industry (2002) uses a different set of SIC codes to describe employment for 
each site. 
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In New Orleans, several terms have been used.  For instance, the recent BNOB plan uses 
the terms “Bio-Med” and “health care industry” interchangeably and mainly addresses the status 
of the downtown “health sciences district,” otherwise known as the “downtown medical 
complex” (BNOB 2006, 29).  Notwithstanding the use of the term in New Orleans, “biomedical” 
usually is defined more restrictively as the use of life sciences for medical applications.  In this 
sense, a biotechnology firm may be engaged in biomedical activity by attempting to 
commercialize a life science-based technology for medical applications as opposed to, for 
example, food processing applications.  However, in New Orleans, Bio-Med inclusively refers to 
biosciences (academic research, private biotech firms, etc.) and the health care industry (health 
services, insurance, etc.).  Despite relying on a similar set of institutions, these sub-categories 
structurally diverge in terms of industrial organization, labor, and production processes.  Health 
services and biosciences/biotechnology may be described more accurately as separate but related 
economic activities, operating at opposite ends of a long and exceptionally complex medical 
production chain.  The BNOB plan reports that the Bio-Med industry supported approximately 
12 percent of the area’s employment in 2004, second only to tourism and first in both revenue 
($8.7 billion) and payroll ($2.7 billion); but health care services account for the vast majority – 
95 percent – of Bio-Med employment.  While New Orleans-Area institutions employ many 
workers in biosciences and medicine-related fields, firms attempting to commercialize 
biomedical technologies employ very few.  Thus, as used in the BNOB plan, the Bio-Med term’s 
inclusiveness may be interpreted as symptomatic of the tendency to employ inflationary 
biotechnology definitions on the local level.  The next chapter reviews the nature of high-
technology regions, with particular attention to the localized aspects of biotechnology 
commercialization. 
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 II.  Literature Review 
 
A General Review of Economic Geographies of Innovative Environments 
 From the definitions above, life sciences and biotechnology epitomize the knowledge 
economy, in contrast with more traditional industries.  A large body of research within economic 
geography, industrial innovation, and economic development addresses this phenomenon and 
highlights two seemingly paradoxical processes at work (Gertler and Levitte 2005).  On one 
hand, the emphasis on knowledge, as a relatively mobile factor of production, to an extent, has 
freed high-technology industries of certain geographical constraints such as hard infrastructure, 
natural resources, and large pools of relatively low-skilled labor.  On the other hand, the most 
knowledge-intensive industries, including biotechnology, show a high degree of geographical 
concentration, reflecting the persistence of a locational pull in the innovation process.  This 
section further explores this dynamic through a critical review of literature on the economic 
geography of innovation, particularly in relation to the biotechnology and life sciences industries, 
and examines how these theories are put into practice within the field of economic development. 
 The process of technological change provides an illustrative starting point, albeit one for 
which a substantial body of literature admittedly has only produced partial understanding.  The 
traditional “linear model” of innovation continues to underlie most policy thinking about 
technology and economic development and also serves as a theory of knowledge production 
(Malecki 1991, 114; see Steinmueller 1994 for a review).  Briefly, the linear model consists of a 
sequential process where “basic” research produces findings, which are refined through 
“applied” research, then tested during the “development” process, and finally commercialized 
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through production, diffusion, and marketing.  Along the way, the outputs of each stage act as 
inputs for the next stage.  The lesson then follows that policy-makers should quite simply strive 
for an appropriate balance between basic research and applied research and that development 
will follow naturally. 
 However, while the linear model continues to inform explanations of the link between 
basic research, innovation, and economic development, many researchers have highlighted the 
shortcomings of such a sterile, unidirectional, and overly simplistic process (Steinmueller 1994; 
Malecki 1991, 115).  In reality, innovation proceeds in a much more disorderly fashion than 
purported by the linear model and varies widely by product and industry.  Numerous feedbacks 
exist both internally and externally to the model’s discrete stages.  For example, the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge may filter through institutional pathways to determine the goals, methods, 
productivity, or funding sources of basic research.  In other cases, inefficiencies or obstacles in 
the development stage may force adjustments upstream in the applied research phase, 
challenging the concept of a unidirectional route of transfer from science to technology.  
Moreover, while the linear model links science with social gains, this innovation and 
development process is situated geographically and socially in ways that complicate the model’s 
conceptual simplicity. 
 More sensitive models of economic growth and development have increasingly directed 
an analysis of local factors of economic growth, that is, the extent to which agglomeration 
reflects a spatially embedded system of innovation.  Since the early 1980s, study has isolated the 
region in particular as a site of “untraded interdependencies” for an industrialized world 
consisting of “Post-Fordist,” “flexibly specialized,” or “learning-based” firms (Storper 1995).  
To be sure, the study of the geographical concentration of economic activity is, by no means, a 
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new topic.  In fact, Weber’s theory of the agglomeration of urban economic activity, Marshall’s 
industrial districts, and Schumpeter’s original observation of the clustering effect have continued 
to lay the theoretical basis – or at least the inspiration – for the work of many industrial 
economists and economic geographers throughout the Twentieth Century.  Many of these 
researchers have tried to offer greater empirical understanding to Marshall’s whimsy that 
“knowledge is in the air;” but while studies have documented the importance of local networks 
and social interaction, the empirical mechanisms of knowledge spillovers and externalities have 
not been made explicit (Feldman 2000, 389; Storper 1995).  Descriptive analyses of local or 
regional innovation and development processes have produced various typologies and 
vocabularies – many of which are not necessarily mutually exclusive – that differ by the specific 
focus of analysis and to a lesser extent by industry, by regionally specific geographical or social 
characteristics, or by the individual researcher’s academic tradition and inclination.   
 To illustrate the diversity of approaches, Marceau (1994) identifies three such lenses for 
analysis and policy formation in national economic systems, named for their central descriptive 
metaphors:  clusters, chains, and complexes.  The clustering of innovative firms, first recognized 
by Schumpeter, stresses interactions between and within related industries, usually highlighting 
the process of geographic concentration at the local, regional, or national level.  Many 
contemporary cluster analyses follow Michael Porter’s influential brand of study, which stresses 
competition between firms and only incidentally mentions geographic concentration and 
productivity gains from locally driven cooperation; others follow the tradition of Marshall’s 
study of industrial districts and foreground geographical concentration and cooperation between 
firms (Marceau 1994, 7).  In the cluster metaphor, firms relate through web-like networks of 
interaction.  The “chains” model, in contrast, stresses firm activities as linkages along a supply 
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chain, or “input-output” system, such that innovations at any level could have consequences 
upstream or downstream in the production process.  Finally, the “complexes” metaphor seeks a 
more holistic account of cooperation between four major groups of actors:  producers (firms), 
public-sector research organizations, users (consumers or other firms), and regulators 
(governments and mediating organizations of all levels) (9).  This approach considers 
government in an active role in innovation policy and research funding, and applies especially 
well to innovative activities with a public welfare component, like health care (10).  Ultimately, 
while none of these lenses offers a total view of the economy, each is a necessary supplement to 
cruder neo-classical views on industrial competitiveness.   
These national systems have regional and local analogs, where more individualized 
spatial relationships take precedence over national- and international-level trade and regulatory 
structures.  Theoretical work has highlighted the salience of such concepts as an “innovative 
milieu” acting as essential infrastructure for innovation, and the most widely cited regional 
archetypes include Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in Boston, Baden-Wurttemburg in 
Southern Germany, and Emilia-Romagna in Northern Italy, among others, where small- or 
medium-sized firms have played an integral role in regional economic success (Cooke and 
Morgan 1994, 25).  This literature stresses collaboration between firms (often in the form of 
“untraded interdependencies”), knowledge spillovers (mainly through the often nebulous concept 
of “networks”), and the importance of a “soft infrastructure” of institutional support for business 
innovation from the public sector, the private sector, or public-private partnerships (Storper 
1995; Cooke and Morgan 1994, 31). 
The literature on the socio-political structures of innovation and economic growth 
seemingly varies almost as much as national, regional, and local systems of innovation 
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themselves.  Likewise, there is some variation across attempts to list the necessary “ingredients” 
of an innovative, entrepreneurial, or “creative” region.  Malecki (1991, 330-334) reviews several 
such lists, most of which include some combination of the following:   
• venture capital availability,  
• the presence of experienced entrepreneurs and a cultural atmosphere for 
entrepreneurialism,  
• a technically skilled labor force,  
• accessibility to suppliers and new markets,  
• favorable government policies and regulations,  
• attractive living conditions,  
• availability of land,  
• adequate transportation and other hard infrastructures,  
• proximity to universities, and  
• supportive institutions.   
 
Of course, several of these “ingredients” are common to most, if not all, large urban areas.  Other 
analyses have added geographical characteristics of agglomerations, including less quantifiable 
factors like the level of instability and uncertainty in the local economy and the diversification of 
economic activity.  Finally, quality of life factors increasingly are seen as necessary for attracting 
and maintaining the more mobile ingredients of an entrepreneurial region, such as knowledge 
and skilled labor, to feed the more locally embedded qualities, such as the entrepreneurial 
climate and institutional support.  Florida’s (2002) writings on the “creative class,” perhaps the 
most famous statement on the link between quality and diversity of life styles and economic 
growth, have achieved a rare level of acceptance among mainstream policymakers in the United 
States.  On the whole, however, while these lists may provide useful analytical taxonomies, 
entrepreneurial environments are too complex to reduce to a few simple variables for 
manipulation through policy, especially when accounting for regional variation (Malecki 1991, 
334).  Despite a persistent lack of empirical clarity, the mechanisms of regional innovative 
milieus are site-specific and path dependant, and often determined by national and international 
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(i.e., non-local) determinants.  Somewhat paradoxically, even as local and regional factors have 
increasingly been subjected to study, contemporary globalized trade and finance networks have 
left technology systems vulnerable to increasingly footloose factors of knowledge and capital, 
counterbalancing the importance of an embedded milieu (Gertler and Levitte 2005).   
As noted above, a diversity of scholarship on regional innovation and entrepreneurialism 
has analyzed the phenomenon of geographically concentrated economic activities.  Lately, this 
academic knowledge filters to policymakers primarily through a clusters approach and most 
commonly through Michael Porter’s particular “brand,” as popularized by his influential research 
and his leadership of the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness.  Indeed, since the 1990s, 
Porter’s work has become de rigueur in the rhetoric of mainstream economic development, 
particularly where economic theory underlies policy decisions that direct the investment of 
public and private funds.  In policy documents concerning New Orleans’ life sciences industry, 
Porter’s theory is the only theoretical work cited; therefore, a closer examination of his model of 
clusters and competitive advantage is merited.  Porter defines a cluster as “a geographically 
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, 
linked by commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 2000, 254).  The geographical scope of 
such clusters may range from a single city to a group of neighboring countries, depending on the 
strength of “spillovers” among a host of related firms, infrastructure providers, training and 
technical support institutions, regulatory agencies, and trade associations (254-255).  In Porter’s 
dynamic formulation, clusters influence competitive advantage in three broad ways:  by 
increasing the static productivity of constituent firms or industries (e.g., through access to 
specialized inputs and labor, access to information and knowledge, complementarities, access to 
institutions and public goods, and through incentives and performance measurement), by 
 17 
increasing a firm’s capacity for innovation and thus for productivity growth, and finally by 
stimulating new business formation that supports innovation and expands the cluster (Porter 
2000, 259).  A “diamond” metaphor, now shorthand for Porter’s model, stresses interactions 
between four sources of local competitive advantage:  factor (input) conditions, demand 
conditions, related and supporting industries, and the context for firm strategy and rivalry (Porter 
1998, 166-167).  Porter has liberally applied this model, ranging from national systems of 
innovation (see The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990) to the potential for inner city 
redevelopment (see “New Strategies for Inner City Economic Development,” 1997). 
Despite a long international tradition of study and policy based around the concept of 
agglomeration’s role in innovation and economic growth, Porter’s cluster model has transformed 
into a mantra for economic development, often carrying with it the enticement of novelty, such 
that Glasmeier (2000, 562) identifies Porter’s influence as a “Fourth Wave” of economic 
development practice, even supplanting the third phase’s primary emphasis on public-private 
partnerships.  Many of these ideas concerning geographical influences on innovation and growth, 
of course, are as old as the fields of economics and economic geography themselves.  Newlands 
(2003), for example, identifies five different theoretical traditions drawn upon by contemporary 
literature:  standard agglomeration theory (from Marshall onwards); transaction costs (the 
“California School”); flexible specialization, trust, and untraded interdependencies; innovative 
milieu (the GREMI Group); and institutional and evolutionary economics.  Benneworth and 
Henry (2003) add Porter to this list – notwithstanding the disputed originality of his contributions 
– since his research has so frequently appeared as a novel touchstone for public policy, ironically 
even as his work downplays active participation by the public sector.  While Porter’s model 
likely owes some of its popularity to its coincidental appearance and theoretical parallels with 
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neo-liberal deregulation processes, some of the approach’s novelty derives from the conceptual 
blending of the cluster model.  That is, while economic geographers generally view the cluster as 
horizontally integrated innovation network, or as a system of non-traded interdependencies like 
trust, geographical economists embark on the assumption that clusters represent an 
agglomeration of economic activity, enhancing local competitive advantage in a liberal growth 
model.  In fact, this difference has caused some antagonism between opposing sides of the 
debate (Benneworth et al. 2003, 515).  Porter, however, stresses the perspective of the private 
sector and its competitive logic, perhaps an artifact of his strategic management background and 
his earlier work on international competitiveness.  Additionally, Porter’s diamond model is 
exceptionally malleable both in its scale, having been applied to analyses of neighborhoods and 
international systems of production alike, and in its terminology, into which almost any 
economic activity could fit as evidence of a cluster. 
To some extent, policymakers have applied Porter’s model to legitimate traditional 
sectoral strategies.  With empirical definitions of clusters, their interior workings, and their 
geographical scales and boundaries still unsettled, the concept lends itself to industrial targeting 
and locality promotion – the presence of nearly any firm could be molded into a potential or 
existing competitive advantage in the cluster model.  At the very least, cluster policies in practice 
include a variety of different and, in many cases, imprecisely defined approaches that are largely, 
if not primarily, determined through the political process.   
Glameier (2000) highlights several problems with the recent renewed interest in clusters.  
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is its proponent’s failure to account for the importance of 
economic diversity in an innovative region.  This boils down to two different types of economic 
agglomeration on which Porter’s model lacks clarity:  “localization,” the clustering of related 
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firms for benefits derived from proximity, shared labor pools, etc., and “urbanization,” the 
mutual gains to productivity arising from a broad mix of proximally located economic activities 
across industries and sectors.  Glasmeier (2000, 566) cites a notable body of research to contend 
that innovation and economic growth derive unambiguously from a locale’s urbanization and 
only in limited cases from a sectorally narrower industrial specialization.  In other words, some 
localities might simply lack the critical economic mass and diversity necessary to support a self-
reinforcing innovative cluster with wide-ranging economic impacts (Malecki 1991, 313-314). 
In addition to concerns with the shortcomings of Porter’s model, some have criticized the 
centrality of the private sector in his discourse.  In particular, his popular article “New Strategies 
for Inner City Economic Development” (1997) has been criticized as the newest example of 
“gilding the ghetto,” as if simply improving neighborhood business climates and decreasing the 
role of the public sector will expose latent competitive advantage and help to alleviate the 
structural causes of persistent poverty.  Harrison and Glasmeier (1997), Blakely and Small 
(1997), and Fainstein and Gray (1997) have convincingly responded that the private sector alone, 
acting through a cluster model, will not alleviate urban poverty and that the public sector must 
play a more active role in theory and strategy.  Still others have criticized the very validity of the 
cluster approach, mainly citing its misappropriation in practice.  To some extent, the academic 
resurgence of the regional cluster, as epitomized by the popularity of Porter’s particular brand, 
has merely translated into rhetoric for locality promotion and a new patina for older industrial 
retention and recruitment policies in economic development practice.  Despite a lack of clarity 
regarding the geographic scale, interior workings, and role of policy in industrial clusters and an 
abundance of evidence to validate the importance of economic diversity and path dependence, 
policymakers have accepted the assumption that technology-based economic development is 
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largely determined by a vague clustering effect.  Consequently, economic development 
professionals and policymakers have routinely sought to promote the indigenous potential of 
their constituent regions to produce or to adapt innovations to commercial uses and have shaped 
the public sector’s role into one of a catalyst or facilitator in attracting, creating, and retaining 
high technology firms.  In this sense, the attractiveness of high-tech industries and the popularity 
of Porter’s pliable, private-sector-centric model have converged to substantiate a trendy rhetoric 
for sectoral strategies.  Blakely and Nishikawa (1992, 241) write,  
In their attempts to formulate new roles and missions, state government leaders have 
evoked attractive images and metaphors based on the experiences of Silicon Valley and 
Boston’s Route 128.  The language used in policy discourse often blurs the distinction 
between description and prescription.  Policy concepts, embedded in high-technology 
success stories, are repeated and diffused through professional networks and the popular 
media. 
 
Yet, despite the attractiveness and adaptability of the image of a high-tech cluster, a long 
tradition of cluster studies, contrary to the optimistic possibilism of recent iterations (i.e., Porter), 
suggests that the capacity for indigenous systems to attain innovation-led economic growth from 
a narrow sectoral specialization is unlikely for the vast majority of regions and localities.  Martin 
and Sunley (2003), in particular, see little more than a powerful and often poorly 
misappropriated “brand” in the concept of clusters, for which Porter is a gatekeeper, eclipsing the 
work of other economic geographers and established theories in the policy arena.  Benneworth 
and Henry (2003) answer this criticism by highlighting the diversity of cluster studies beyond 
Porter’s influence and the potential for interaction between diverse, even unsettled theoretical 
positions.   In particular, they draw on Barnes’s description of the recent phase of “hermeneutic” 
economic geography that is open-ended, reflexive, catholic in its theoretical sources, and self-
consciously perspectival and partial (Barnes 2001, 561).  Given some rigor with respect to 
recognizing the multiplicity of theoretical traditions, “the value added of the clusters approach 
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(drawing on hermeneutic theorizing) lies in, first, allowing for and explicitly promoting these 
theoretical conversations and, secondly, the potential this may afford in which multiple 
explanations can interact conceptually to provide a richer understanding of the situation than 
permitted by theoretically monistic approaches” (Benneworth and Henry 2003, 1018).  It is from 
this perspective that the following account of biotechnology in New Orleans brings a variety of 
sources to bear on the Bio-Med “cluster” as the unit of analysis – even if this use of the term is 
open to interpretation.  The analysis is somewhat purposefully open-ended and complex, as is the 
situation itself, determined by factors relating to the regional health care system as well as to 
local milieu.  Before considering New Orleans, however, a review of biotechnology experiences 
in other regions offers a basis for comparison. 
 
Comparative Case Studies of Bioscience Clusters 
Preceding sections have floated working definitions and descriptions of the 
biotechnology industry and have discussed broad trends in research on – and strategic 
implementations of – technology-driven local systems of economic development.  This section 
combines these themes into a review of existing case studies for biotechnology clusters, with the 
aim to draw out industry-specific determinants of successful development.  To an extent, this 
attempt draws more heavily from economic development literature, which views biotechnology 
in particular as an increasingly enticing target for local growth efforts, as opposed to economic 
geography, which often – perhaps to a fault – lumps biotechnology together with other 
knowledge-intensive activities in a more generic model of flexible-specialization.2  Of course, 
                                                 
2 This claim is not without exception.  Walcott’s (1999; 2002) work, in particular, exemplifies an 
attempt to bridge the divide between theory-oriented economic geographers observing 
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these perspectives are related:  the biotechnology industry is maturing, and as a course in its 
“life-cycle,” its expansion and codification of products and processes will rearrange the diffusion 
of benefits to participating localities.  In this sense, biotechnology appears to have the 
characteristic of a new “core technology,” with the potential to underpin a new paradigm of 
development (Gertler and Levitte 2005); and state and local policymakers view increasing or 
maintaining participation in this process as an attractive possibility, even while literature specific 
to the locational needs of biotechnology firms remains insufficient (Walcott 1999, 48).   
In a broad snapshot of the biotechnology industry, Cortright and Mayer (2002, 3) note a 
high degree of concentration:  9 of the nation’s 51 largest metropolitan areas house three quarters 
of the largest biotech firms, and only four of these account for the majority of recent growth 
(Fitzgerald 2006, 115).  While NIH funding for basic research and biotech patents has dispersed 
in recent decades, the private financing system has become increasingly concentrated within the 
top tier of biotech regions, which “account for 88 percent of all venture capital for 
biopharmaceuticals, 92 percent of the most active biotechnology venture capital firms, and 96 
percent of the dollar value of research alliances with pharmaceutical firms” (Cortright and Mayer 
2002, 33-34).  Further below in the biotechnology hierarchy, 28 metropolitan areas, including 
New Orleans, contain some significant biotechnology research and commercialization but at 
levels well below the top-heavy average of the entire group.  The authors refer to these areas as 
“median” metropolitan areas, and the most intense competition to emerge as a nascent 
biotechnology center is most likely to take place here.  
The major biotechnology “core” areas have several features in common, which may be 
interpreted as likely preconditions for successful development.  Broadly, these biotech centers 
                                                                                                                                                             
biotechnology development after-the-fact and practice-oriented economic development scholars 
attempting to build best practices for influencing biotechnology development ex ante. 
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share two key characteristics of a strong research capacity and the ability to convert research into 
successful commercial activity through access to capital and a developed entrepreneurial climate 
(Cortright and Mayer 2002, 3).  Still, some variation exists within the top tier.  While carving the 
mold for American high-technology development in general, Boston and San Francisco have led 
the biotechnology industry since its inception in the 1970s.  The Philadelphia and New York 
metropolitan areas have historically housed headquarters for the nations largest pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. The Washington-Baltimore area contains a significant biomedical research 
establishment, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  The Los Angeles area houses 
the nation’s largest biotech firm, Amgen.  Newer entrants San Diego, Seattle, and Raleigh-
Durham have built upon the local assets of a well recognized, well-funded research 
establishment and a climate favorable to start-up firms.  These three newcomer regions, together 
with Boston and San Francisco, account for the vast majority of growth in new biotech firms 
(Cortright and Mayer 2002, 3).  As a whole, these exemplary areas share not only proximity to 
pre-commercial research institutions like universities but also the financial and entrepreneurial 
conditions required to sustain the large level of private investment necessary to adapt basic 
research into marketable products. 
The top tier group expectedly accounts for the focus of the majority of existing biotech 
literature, and several relevant case studies highlight certain aspects of biotechnology-based 
development in specific regions or localities.  Walcott (2002) uses San Diego’s bioscience 
cluster to illustrate the dynamics underlying the construction of an innovative environment.3  Her 
interviews with local industry professionals reveal five key factors underlying regional success:  
                                                 
3 In reference to the earlier discussion of unfixed terminology in life sciences-related industries, 
Walcott focuses on biopharmaceutical and medical device firms, which she terms “bioscience” 
firms, as opposed to, for example, bioagricultural firms (2002, 99). 
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access to an outstanding research university, advocacy leadership, risk financing, and 
entrepreneurial culture, and appropriate real estate for each stage in a firm’s growth, preferably 
in proximity to related university research activity.  Her narrative of San Diego’s emergence as 
“Bioscience Beach” stresses the strong interpersonal component of knowledge networks as well 
as the importance of a role model firm, Hybritech, originally a tech-transfer project from the 
University of California, San Diego, that capitalized on a broad convergence between the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries during the 80s.  In an excellent example of the 
development of a local entrepreneurial milieu, wealthy Hybritech employees helped to spin off 
numerous additional companies, forming a core of local venture capitalist “angels” eager to stay 
in an area attractive for both life-style and professional reasons through self-reinforcing cluster 
activities (105).  Rather than relying on firms and labor from outside, San Diego’s bioscience 
cluster was able to generate its own skilled labor and knowledge flows from local universities 
and research institutions like Scripps Research Institute, helping to allow the creation of smaller, 
locally embedded enterprises instead of attracting established firms from outside.  Active 
advocacy and leadership, most notably the often-emulated industrial organization CONNECT, 
also played as key role, both through nurturing new and existing firms and through lobbying 
governments at all levels. 
Huag and Ness (1993) investigate industrial location decisions for biotech firms by 
surveying industry executives in the Seattle area.  They conclude that R&D and manufacturing 
facility locations emphasize founder preferences, proximity to university or company facilities, 
labor agglomeration economies, and local infrastructure, with manufacturing facilities 
particularly displaying a greater concern for land and labor costs.  Local regulations and taxes 
add additional wrinkles to the complex importance of proximity for R&D and manufacturing 
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activities.  Factors accounting for Seattle’s success include strong federal research funding at the 
University of Washington, a local entrepreneurial climate to actively nurture small enterprises 
and spin-off firms, an a priori concentration of numerous other high-tech firms (e.g., Microsoft, 
Boeing) to condition access to knowledge and labor, and the presence of several successful “role 
model” biotech firms.  Interestingly, Huag and Ness note that the Seattle cluster, like most other 
biotech centers, developed without significantly organized and comprehensive biotech-specific 
efforts on the part of university or state agencies (399).  Nonetheless, they recommend that, to 
implement viable strategies for biotech development, state and local governments should 
increase the availability of venture capital funding, support scientific and technical education 
programs, assist in obtaining federal university research funding, maintain consistency in 
regulatory policies, develop efficient and effective technology transfer systems, and, possibly, 
establish incubator or scientific support facilities.  The authors also discount the effectiveness of 
incentives, subsidies, tax concessions, and low-interest loans for attracting new industry (399).   
Feldman and Francis’s (2003) description of the rise of Maryland’s biotech cluster 
emphasizes the role of public investment and existing strengths in life sciences research and 
talent around the Capitol Region as enabling factors for entrepreneurialism in the innovative 
milieu.  Proximity to universities (Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland) and government 
departments (the NIH and FDA) and their attendant research laboratories aid the cluster by 
anchoring personnel movements, technology licensing, and collaborative research agreements 
(770-771).  The state has kept pace with a national trend by constructing 11 business incubators, 
some including crucial wet-lab space for biotech as well as firm consulting, ancillary business 
services, and infrastructure (773).  Like other regions, Maryland has an active non-profit industry 
organization, MdBio, to aid in funding and cluster promotion (773).  Maryland’s biotech 
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emergence is notable because public-sector employment has historically dominated the Capitol 
Area in an economic system generally not considered exceptionally conducive to innovative or 
entrepreneurial activity.  Feldman and Francis describe the transformation as a result of a three-
stage process:  federal-level economic restructuring and policy changes to favor biotechnology 
enterprises,4 increased local entrepreneurial competency for start-ups in a region lacking a more 
traditional large corporation, and a fully functioning entrepreneurial environment within an 
innovative and adaptable industrial cluster.  Beyond state- and local-level cluster policy, this 
particular narrative is deeply tied to exogenous forces and to the unique characteristics of the 
Capitol Region, mainly government laboratories and universities and their respective pools of 
skilled labor.  In Feldman and Francis’ estimation, cluster policies such as incubators, incentives, 
and funding initiatives lagged behind rather than led entrepreneurial engagement with an existing 
concentration of biosciences-related activity.  Overall, the Maryland experience provides a 
significant challenge to a one-size-fits-all policy for building an innovative cluster without a 
strong tradition of entrepreneurialism.  
Acs, Herron, and Sapienza (1992) hone in on the financing component of Maryland’s 
biotechnology industry, primarily centered on the Baltimore-Washington Region.  Through firm 
surveys, they find that the majority of Maryland’s biotech firms import capital mainly from New 
York and New England, implying that Maryland’s significant biotech cluster lacks the local 
venture capital networks present in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (381).  Despite the Baltimore 
Area’s research and institutional strengths, a gap exists between local venture capital community 
and the financial needs of early-stage and start-up firms, hindering the effectiveness of other 
                                                 
4 In this case, the federal government’s role included setting a national research agenda with 
broad funding distributed through laboratories and grants, and establishing regulations and 
standards for the industry as a whole (Feldman and Francis 2003, 785).  The Capitol Region was 
particularly well-positioned to take advantage of these changes. 
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strategic interventions, such as incubators and shared facilities to promote technology-based 
development.5  Gertler and Levitte (2005) offer similar findings for Canadian biotech firms, 
which they cite as evidence to destabilize the recent literature’s emphasis on the importance of 
local networks of capital and information flows vis a vis global networks.  These non-local flows 
may simply reflect biotechnology’s maturity as an industry and its need to expand relationships 
beyond the nursery of a local innovative milieu; but in any case, a successful biotech region 
likely must be open to inter-regional and even inter-national flows of knowledge and capital. 
Even within a given region, there exists a diversity of experiences.  Fitzgerald and Leigh 
(2002) use New Haven’s attempt to build a Bioscience Cluster to capitalize on Yale’s research 
strength as an example of technology-led sectoral strategies.  Despite being located within the 
New York region,6 the state, the city, and the university were relative latecomers in targeting 
biotechnology.  Part of New Haven’s success followed from a change in leadership at Yale in the 
early 1990s, when the university began to actively sponsor university biomedical programs 
aimed at creating a cluster that would mutually benefit New Haven’s economic development and 
the university’s research agenda (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 54).  Along with a state-level 
adoption of Porter-influenced initiatives, a non-profit oversight corporation, Connecticut United 
for Research Excellence, Inc. (CURE), facilitates information exchange and communication 
among Bioscience Cluster members and publicizes and markets the cluster’s contributions.  
CURE has also been successful in lobbying for favorable tax incentives for research and biotech 
start-ups and for streamlining permits.  Meanwhile, the state has provided successful gap capital 
                                                 
5 Feldman and Francis’ (2003) later study on Maryland, while not focusing discretely on venture 
capital, mentioned the region’s relative lack of seed funding as a continuing weakness when 
compared with other top biotech clusters. 
6 New Haven is located within the top-tier New York Region as Cortright and Mayer (2002) 
define it, following the census New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 
CMSA. 
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funds for the fixed costs (e.g., lab and office space) of startups, since venture capitalists are much 
more likely to finance research and development costs (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 57).  The city 
has taken a facilitator role through marketing, investments aimed at improving quality-of-life, 
strategic real estate development (including business incubators and brownfield redevelopment), 
and regulations.  Private real estate investors and biotechnology companies have followed with 
their own investments in laboratory and office space.  Fitzgerald and Leigh, however, note a 
weak link in the New Haven cluster strategy:  workforce development at the state and local 
levels (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 62).  While experts predict future labor shortages as demand 
for biotech labor grows, many of these positions require only community college training rather 
than college degrees.  However, Connecticut has made little effort to offer relevant associates 
degree programs, and biotechnology firms remain skeptical that workers with only associate’s 
degrees could fill their positions (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 62).   Another criticism addresses 
distributional issues.  High-technology sectoral strategies create mostly high-wage, high-skill 
jobs and benefit only a narrow range of occupations (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 64).  The 
venture capital, real estate needs, and infrastructural investments of biotech strategies, such as 
business incubators and lab space, require a particularly high rate of subsidy per directly created 
job.  In a sense, Connecticut’s sectoral initiatives have replaced an older corporate-subsidy 
approach to economic development, where benefits are expected to trickle down through 
economic multipliers (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 65).   
Moving further from the core biotech regions, Walcott (1999) explores spatial aspects of 
the biomedical industry in and around Atlanta, which remains underdeveloped as an innovative 
milieu despite the region’s steady growth since the 1980s.  Her surveys and interviews reveal the 
primacy of “personal real estate factors” (roughly comparable to quality of life concerns) over 
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place-based innovation characteristics or inter-firm linkages as priorities for firm location 
decisions.  As such, endogenous agglomeration advantages such as knowledge spillovers are 
apparent, but their contribution to the broader local accumulation of knowledge is muted (67).  
Biotech agglomerations thus have paralleled the proliferation of “technoburbs” in the Atlanta 
region (Fishman 1987) and the restructuring of medical laboratories and hospitals to 
accommodate the demands of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (Walcott 1999, 66-67), 
and have been crucial for attracting skilled technical and management talent.  Atlanta certainly 
offers regional strengths as a growing area with an established presence of a skilled workforce, 
ample hard infrastructure, and life sciences-related institutions like the CDC.7  However, Walcott 
concludes that no shortage of structural “pull” factors nor a prevalence of less favorable “push” 
factors hinder development of an innovative milieu; rather, a lack of agency, such as a key 
networking individual or mediating organization, critically retards the biomedical cluster’s 
emergence into regional growth engine. 
Fitzgerald (2006) focuses on career ladders and workforce development in core 
biotechnology regions. Tailoring her focus around the more labor-intensive biomanufacturing 
processes, her review reveals successes in matching community college programs with demand 
for biotech labor, especially for lab-tech positions requiring only a two-year degree.  However, 
Fitzgerald (2006, 115) warns that only the largest biotech centers are best positioned to capture 
growth on the manufacturing end, as proximity to R&D and path dependence involved with 
permitting new plants hedge growth in the years ahead.  Furthermore, biotech firms are, by 
nature, high-risk, high-reward operations.  Only about 20 percent of drugs in early trials ever 
make it to market, and only about 30 percent of these produce profits higher than the cost of 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, Coca-Cola was instrumental in luring the CDC to Atlanta (Walcott 1999, 62). 
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R&D, which in most cases runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars (115).  Fitzgerald 
succinctly and convincingly expresses a case for tempered optimism regarding the potential for 
biotech growth in marginal areas: 
In brief, states that court the biotech industry – job-training programs, tax abatements, 
venture capital, and other incentives to reduce a new company’s start-up costs – are 
taking a big risk.  And, in most cases, it probably is not a smart one (115). 
 
Even successful biotech strategies, such as business incubators, utilize a high rate of subsidy per 
directly created job (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002).  Moreover, biotech firms, by nature, seek a 
flexible approach to maximizing profits through partnerships with universities and especially 
with large pharmaceutical firms from outside of the region – a complex and footloose 
interregional economic geography.  Most of these small firms have little interest in growing into 
the size of incumbent biotechnology firms.  Consequently, much of the benefit from local 
policies aimed at improving the entrepreneurial climate, such as business incubators and 
subsidies, accrues elsewhere, mainly in the top tier of biotechnology regions.   
Most successful biotechnology commercialization, perhaps one out of one thousand 
patented innovations, may require a decade of development (Cortright and Mayer 2002, 4).  
Moreover, even in established biotechnology centers, the overall size of the biotechnology sector 
is relatively small when compared with the overall regional economy.  For the nine leading 
biotechnology centers, pharmaceutical manufacturing employment accounts for only 3.5 percent 
of total manufacturing employment (35).  While economic developers in wide range of regions 
gaze longingly on a biotechnology as an industry poised to explode, the expected aggregate 
growth realistically will not drive significant local activity in the vast majority of cases.   
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 III.  Building a Bio-Med Cluster in New Orleans 
 The preceding sections have offered standard definitions for biosciences- and 
biotechnology-related terms, discussions of the geography of innovative regions in general, and 
comparative case studies of biotechnology-oriented economic development.  This section applies 
these concepts to New Orleans, with the goal of critically assessing the region’s attempts to 
cultivate biotechnology and the various economic, political, and geographic constraints on this 
possibility.  First, a snapshot of New Orleans’ Bio-Med industries before Katrina highlights the 
city’s assets and strategies leading up to the massive upheaval of late 2005.  Next, a brief 
summary of various planning efforts since the storm suggests new challenges and opportunities 
for planning biosciences as an economic development project.  This planning process, however, 
is primarily characterized by a host of other, more immediate considerations in a political system 
primarily charged with managing several massive recovery and rebuilding projects.  
Restructuring the regional health care system, itself the subject of a major planning effort, is only 
one of these other projects, but its trajectory has critical implications for the biosciences industry, 
since many of the same educational and research institutions serve as lynchpins of the regional 
potential for biotechnology competitiveness.  The concluding section speculates on the decision-
making process as it relates to biosciences and health care in the post-Katrina environment and 
the implications for economic development policy. 
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Pre-Katrina Attempts to Capitalize on the University Research Base 
Biosciences-related Universities and Institutions 
 Prior to Katrina, New Orleans’ main biosciences strength lay in the value of research 
conducted at local universities.  Awards from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are 
generally regarded as a benchmark figure for publicly funded biotech-related research activity, 
and higher levels generally suggest greater opportunities for commercial ventures and 
partnerships involving private biotech firms. In 2002, the metro area’s $77.3 million in NIH 
funding placed the region 48th in the country (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 35).  
According to the BNOB plan (2006, 30), in 2003, federal and private grant funding for New 
Orleans bioscience institutions exceeded $180 million and showed substantial growth in recent 
years.  An earlier plan placed the value of research performed at Tulane University Health 
Sciences Center HSC, Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC), and the 
University of New Orleans (UNO) at $232 million, which includes substantial biomedical 
initiatives in gene therapy, neuroscience, cancer, ophthalmology, peptides, biology, conservation 
biology, and assisted reproductive technology (BRDP 2002, 15).  In fiscal year 2005, the New 
Orleans Area accounted for $129.8 million in awards from the NIH, representing 74 percent of 
the total amount awarded within the entire state of Louisiana (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 
2005, 11).  These high figures generally have kept pace with a national trend toward increasing 
research funding in the health sciences. 
Tulane University and Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, New Orleans, 
received the vast majority of NIH research funding, at $71 million and $41 million, respectively, 
in 2005 (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 11).  The inclusion of other program revenue 
funds increases these totals to over $100 million for each institution.  Both universities have a 
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substantial presence in the New Orleans CBD, where various medical educational, research, and 
clinical facilities operated by each school anchor the downtown medical district (see Figure 1).  
These facilities are key components of the regional and, when accounting for their role in 
training Louisiana’s health workforce, statewide health care systems. LSUHSC trains 70 percent 
of the state’s health care professionals in a variety of disciplines and manages the state’s unique 
network of eight public hospitals, otherwise known as the Charity System.  To promote 
economic development, to attract faculty with licensing opportunities, and to generate revenue, 
Tulane entered the intellectual property field in 1985, and LSU organized its own Office of 
Technology Development in 2000.  These offices handle patent applications and licensing for 
intellectual property generated within the institutions.  Both offices have forged successful 
partnerships and joint ventures with local and national firms, local hospitals, and other research 
organizations.  In FY 2003, Tulane was 21st among all U.S. universities – and 10th among private 
universities – in royalty and licensing fees with $11 million (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 
2005, 14).   
Xavier University and the University of New Orleans account for the majority of the 
balance of local NIH funding to universities.8  Xavier’s clinical and research faculty numbered 
200 before Katrina, and this group accounted for approximately $8 million in NIH funding 
annually and another $16 million in sponsored program research funding (BNOB Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005, 17).  Major programs include one of the nation’s most successful pharmacy 
schools9 and the Center for Bioenvironmental Research, a partnership with Tulane University.  
                                                 
8 Other recipients of major NIH funding include Children’s Hospital, Ochsner Regional Medical 
Center, Dillard University, and two private bioscience firms. 
9 A historically black university, Xavier holds one of only seven pharmacy schools in the Deep 
South.  The highly competitive school produces 25 percent of the nation’s African American 
pharmacists. 
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Figure 1.  The Bio-Med Industry of Greater New Orleans 
 
SOURCES:  BDRP 2002 (Medical Complex), BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005 
(Biotechnology Firms), NOLA Dashboard (hospital locations); NOTE:  Out of 16 separate 
addresses listed, 13 were mappable as firm locations, with two firms located in St. Tammany 
Parish (not shown). 
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The University of New Orleans employed 45 researchers in bioscience-related fields, accounting 
for approximately $5 million in NIH funding in addition to $35 million in other sponsored 
program related revenue.  In recent years, UNO has been increasingly active in projects to 
promote technology transfer and entrepreneurialism.  UNO’s Office of Technology Transfer 
resides in the UNO Research and Technology Foundation.  UNO also holds a formal research 
affiliation with Children’s Hospital through the Bioinformatics Center. 
 
Biotechnology-related Economic Development Initiatives 
This critical mass of universities and related institutions and, more directly, the high-
skilled workforce and life sciences research generated within has been touted as a basis for 
growth, a regional strength unmatched throughout the Mid-South (BRDP 2002; BNOB 2006, 
31).  Consequently, many of the state’s strategic interventions in biosciences-related economic 
development have sought to directly enhance the ability of universities to attract top researchers 
while boosting the hard and soft infrastructures required to gain research funding.  Malecki 
(1991, 305) lists three economically beneficial outcomes from university enhancement policies:  
research findings lead to scientific innovations and general technological advancement, the 
development of a center of excellence in a certain field can enhance a favorable public image, 
and training provides a pool of labor which can be important to regional recruiting.  While this 
may be sound educational policy, despite a few exemplary stories of local high-tech industries 
growing in tandem with universities, to expect innovative firms to cluster around knowledge 
centers is unrealistic (306).  Fitzgerald and Leigh (2002, 54) agree that the presence of a major 
research university is a necessary but not sufficient component of biotechnology sectoral 
strategies.  The variety of case studies presented earlier certainly portrays much more complex 
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forces at work in innovative regions.  As discussed earlier, university enhancement strategies 
hearken back to the linear model of innovation, containing little direct concern for the various 
geographical components of clusters, such as spillover effects, competition and 
complementarities, or innovative milieus.  As recounted below, the most distinctly geographical 
concern running through recent biosciences policy has been to improve the downtown medical 
district, which houses LSUHSC, Tulane HSC, the Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital, 
Charity Hospital, Delgado Community College – Charity School of Nursing, and several other 
medical and research institutions. 
Louisiana’s attempt to promote the region’s attractiveness for biotech development may 
be traced back at least to the mid 1980s (Economic Development Council 1985).  State and local 
plans have always touted the region’s strength in research and talent, highlighting the downtown 
concentration of research, education, and medical facilities in downtown New Orleans anchored 
by LSU and Tulane’s Health Sciences Centers.  Prior to Katrina, two groups served in an 
organizational role within the downtown Bio-Med district for economic development purposes.  
The New Orleans Medical Complex, Inc. (NOrMC) – a private, 501 (c)(3) non-profit corporation 
that has organized and planned shared infrastructure and collaborative efforts among institutions 
with a stake in New Orleans’ Bio-Med activities – shared similar member institutions and 
geographical boundaries with the Louisiana Biomedical Research and Development Park 
(BRDP), a commission established in 1991 by the state legislature to improve health care, to 
create jobs, and to encourage outside research investment (BRDP 2002).  According to the 
BDRP’s (2002) 10-year plan update, NOrMC has a proven history of successful project 
management.  NOrMC’s member institutions generated more than $2.2 billion and 23,900 jobs 
through construction activities alone between 1992 and 2002 (BDRP 2002, 15).  The BDRP, on 
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the other hand, remained largely inactive over the same period, with the notable exception of 
producing two planning documents.  After the original planning phase and the establishment of 
the BDRP Commission in 1992, little implementation occurred in the next ten years, mainly due 
to a lack of funding (BDRP 2002, 8).  The legislature provided substantial tax incentives, but it 
failed to appropriate funds to market and construct state-of-the-art facilities or to subsidize 
tenants’ rent, access to venture capital, and incubator operating costs.  Additionally, the state’s 
mid-1990s Medicaid crisis, along with a looming general fund shortfall, necessitated 
restructuring and reorganization among BRDP member institutions and curtailed construction 
projects (BRDP 2002, 9).  In the first decade, tax credits alone did not prove sufficient to attract 
firms and capital investment to the cluster. 
Despite these challenges, several trends reinforced continuing optimism regarding the 
competitiveness of BRDP member institutions.  Anchored by Tulane and LSU Health Sciences 
Centers, BRDP institutions have performed increasingly well with respect to the value of current 
contracted research (well over $200 million) and the quantity of invention disclosures 
(approximately 100 in 2002) – success unmatched throughout most of the South (BRDP 2002, 
15).  The BRDP plan cites the success and popularity of similar initiatives in other cities and 
states and repeatedly warns against losing competitive advantage through inaction (BRDP 2002, 
16, 19).10 A state-level plan for three wet-lab business incubators cites the existence of similar 
programs in 18 states (BDRP 2002 Appendix 4).  Emphasizing that the presence of a local 
research university is simply not enough to offset shortcomings in entrepreneurial climate or 
venture capitalism, Malecki (1991, 344) hints at the limitations of New Orleans’ relatively late 
                                                 
10 The 1992 comprehensive plan utilized a multiplier of greater than three to project the ripple 
effects of direct spending and employment of BDRP member institutions (BDRP 2002, 8).  The 
2002 update report also uses downward multiplier adjustments as evidence of the New Orleans 
Region’s loss of economic diversity and, thus, the urgency of funding for cluster initiatives. 
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attempt to join the trend of encouraging spin-off biotech firms.  To counter these shortcomings, 
incubator facilities address the capital risks of new companies and, given strict oversight by 
governing bodies, can dramatically improve a local entrepreneurship (349).  While regional and 
local policies may struggle to generate high-tech entrepreneurship, incubators and capital pools 
may encourage entrepreneurs to stay in the area or, to a lesser extent, may attract firms from 
outside of the region.  In fact, the state’s biosciences incubator plan proudly cites evidence from 
the National Business Incubator Association, which shows that while only 20 percent of all 
business start-ups survive past two years, over 80 percent of businesses beginning operations in 
an incubator survive to “graduate” from the incubator and remain in the area.  Additionally, the 
BDRP (2002, 29) plan lists six factors to foster such entrepreneurialism:  quality building space 
with adequate capacity, shared experience and consultation, access to venture capital, improved 
access to specialized equipment, management support services, and real estate tax incentives.  
The first five are addressed in part by the proposed wet-lab business incubator; the last, by the 
BDRP/NOrMC’s ability to lease land and by state tax credits currently offered to start-ups 
locating in research parks. 
 In its plea for greater funding commitment from the state, the BRDP plan situates the 
biomedical cluster within former Governor Foster’s Louisiana: Vision 2020 comprehensive plan 
for economic development, specifically within the context of its goals for economic 
diversification through technology (Economic Development Council 2003).  Vision 2020 makes 
heavy reference to the cluster model, echoed by the BRDP’s attempt to align within the state’s 
more recently drafted economic development plan:  “The action component of a cluster strategy 
dramatically increases the communication between these various participants, in order to greatly 
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increase the business they do together and to establish linkages that make their efforts most 
competitive in the market” (BRDP 2002, 11).   
 The BRDP/NOrMC’s role, then, coincides with state and local goals for the biotech sector, 
one of the most important clusters targeted by Vision 2020.  Accordingly, BRDP implementation 
directly relates to three overarching goals in Vision 2020.  First, the BRDP intends to promote 
the broad objective of a “learning enterprise,” whereby highly educated employees generate 
efficiency and technological advances in the workplace while employers support access to 
continuing education (BRDP 2002, 12).  Second, by coordinating the efforts of medical 
education programs, the BDRP intends to support diverse and thriving technology-intensive 
industries that actively utilize Louisiana’s colleges and universities as a source for graduates, 
expertise, and technology suitable for commercialization (BDRP 2002, 13).  And third, the 
BDRP intends to improve the standard of living in Louisiana, which implies increasing the 
quality and quantity of jobs and decreasing unemployment and poverty in each region of the 
State (BDRP 2002, 13).  However, the BDRP has remained a largely inactive organization, 
leaving the region devoid of the necessary type of biotech-specific, business-oriented leadership, 
advocacy, and networking organization that has keyed the emergence of new innovative biotech 
regions in the 1990s and 2000s.  Tommy Kurtz, GNO, Inc.’s senior vice president over job 
development, says that New Orleans needs such an advocate group to focus resources on 
biotechnology strategies:  “There is really no coordinating entity that is linking everything 
together and representing the business side or really has that business component” (Biz New 
Orleans, 11 April 2005).  In contrast to the strong leadership in regions like San Diego (where 
CONNECT has become a national model), Research Triangle Park, New Haven, Baltimore-
Washington, and Seattle, Walcott (1999) writes that Atlanta’s lack of such leadership critically 
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retards the local cluster’s development.  Additionally, when compared with Atlanta and its 
steady growth as a Sunbelt city in recent decades, New Orleans has, in many ways, lost an 
amount of economic diversity, which researchers emphasize is necessary to support an 
innovative, entrepreneurial cluster (Glasmeier 2000; Malecki 1991).   
Still, the state has made some progress in recent years toward supporting economic 
development through the university research agenda and in fulfilling the BDRP plan’s plea for a 
biotechnology incubator in the New Orleans CBD.  The legislature established the Louisiana 
Gene Therapy Research Consortium (LGTRC) as a partnership among LSUHSC-New Orleans, 
LSUHSC-Shreveport, and Tulane University Health Sciences Center to help lure top research 
talent and funding for cell and gene therapy research and production and to encourage 
entrepreneurship.  The partnership’s broad goal is to promote statewide economic growth and job 
creation, and its programs employ 152 individuals and have brought grants totaling more than 
$36 million into the state (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 28).  The LGTRC also has 
worked to establish a Good Manufacturing Practices compliant facility (GMP), which 
manufactures gene and cell therapeutics for use in clinical trials.  The GMP aims to attract firms 
as customers, some of whom hopefully would perform clinical trials or even locate facilities in 
the state. 
Additionally, the GMP is an important component of the state’s largest biotechnology 
initiative to-date, a network of three biotechnology incubators in New Orleans, Shreveport, and 
Baton Rouge, offering a total of over 180,000 sq. ft. of wet lab space as well as traditional office 
space.  Accounting for one third of the state’s initial $30 million investment, the New Orleans 
BioInnovation Center differs from the other versions in that it is also viewed as an investment in 
downtown redevelopment.  Looking beyond the expected economic impact of 200 new jobs, 
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Arthur Cooper, CEO of the LSU System Research and Technology Foundation in Baton Rouge, 
highlights the “urban renewal” component of the New Orleans facility:  "Unlike the facility in 
Baton Rouge, the BioInnovation Center is really part of an urban renewal strategy; because the 
center will be located downtown, the BioInnovation Center will help attract researchers and 
redevelop a part of the city" (Kral 2006).  This notion generally correlates with Malecki’s (1991, 
310) contention that business incubators and science parks serve more as real estate policy than 
as technology policy.  In New Orleans’ case, an incubation “place” will supplement existing but 
more passive and fragmented incubation “policies” to encourage entrepreneurship through 
academic research institutions and incentives (Blakely and Nishikawa 1992).  Blakely and 
Nishikawa (1992) stress that such places – brick-and-mortar investments such as the 
BioInnovation Center – can shape a plausible role for economic development, where the public 
sector fills a structural gap by intervening at early stages in a firm’s life cycle.  In this sense, 
localities mobilize the “incubator metaphor” as a process model, influencing policy choices to 
meet individual needs, rather than as a standard, discrete checklist item for biotechnology 
strategies.  Still, some degree of faddism certainly has characterized the proliferation of 
biotechnology incubators and GMP facilities, since many regions list similar facilities among 
their assets.  For example, North Carolina’s successful incubator has operated for the past 25 
years, and Houston alone currently claims four GMP labs (Blakely and Nishikawa 1991, 250; 
Kral 2006). 
The BioInnovation Center will house the LGTRC’s GMP facility.  Additionally, a multi-
purpose, full-service Wet Laboratory Incubator, operated as a community resource to nurture 
new businesses, would facilitate the transformation of intellectual property created in universities 
and research institutions into start-up companies (BRDP 2002, 31).  Under one roof, the 
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BioInnovation Center would house incubator services – such as subsidized rent for start-ups, 
business consulting, and streamlined access to funding sources – and access to testing facilities 
to reduce fixed costs.  The Center’s proponents have stressed proximity in locating the facility in 
the downtown medical district.  The BDRP plan suggested conversion of the long abandoned 
Wirth Building on Canal Street, a location that contributes to wider efforts of downtown 
redevelopment (BRDP 2002, Appendix A: 5).  Also, the structure’s size allows for the inclusion 
of market-rate tenants in addition to subsidized businesses that would benefit directly from 
shared wet lab facilities and business development services.  The BioInnovation Center’s focus 
on business development demands that recruitment efforts target businesses at an early stage of 
product development.  For example, during early stages, many biotech firms in the New Orleans 
Area have had to subcontract testing facilities in other areas (Biz New Orleans, 11 April 2005).  
The BioInnovation Center would help to tie this function to the local medical cluster and to 
facilitate the success and retention of existing and new local businesses.  In the words of Stephen 
Moye, CEO of LGTRC, the center provides a hard infrastructure component of the “value chain” 
which local biotech initiatives have tried to fashion (Kral 2006).  The BDRP Plan estimated that 
renovations and wet lab construction would be completed by summer, 2004, at a cost of $15 
million (BRDP 2002, Appendix A: 2,7).   
The state legislature approved funding for the BioInnovation Center, along with similar 
facilities in Baton Rouge and Shreveport, in 2002 as part of the Governor’s Biotechnology 
Initiative.  While Shreveport’s BioSpace 1 commenced operations in late 2005, followed by 
Baton Rouge’s Louisiana Emerging Technologies Center in 2006, the New Orleans 
BioInnovation Center suffered several holdups, even before Katrina.  Structural problems with 
the Wirth Building led engineers to determine that the structure was not suitable for the heavy 
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equipment and space required for the laboratory.  Instead, the Wirth Building was demolished to 
allow an entirely new, 130,000 square foot structure to be completed by mid-2007 at a cost of 
$30 million.  With the Louisiana Gene Therapy Research Consortium initially acting as an 
anchor tenant, the BioInnovation Center is expected to create 200 jobs, but supporters are even 
more optimistic about its long-run effects from successful business ventures that eventually 
“graduate” from the incubator.  Citing statistics that claim the existence of 7000 unfilled 
medical-sector jobs in the city, Mayor Nagin’s comments at the Wirth Building’s demolition 
ceremony summarize this position:  “What we are doing today is what I’m calling our Nissan 
plant.  If we do what we are talking about today, we can double those [7,000] openings” (Biz 
New Orleans, 11 April 2005).  Here, Nagin blurs the distinction between medical jobs and 
biotechnology jobs; but while these industries may rely on the same institutions, they exist at 
entirely different ends of the production chain.  Biotechnology initiatives seek to bridge the gap 
between university research and entrepreneurialism while medical employment intends to link a 
skilled workforce with regional, state, and federal health care systems.  Thus, the prospect of 
creating and filling opportunities in each sector structurally differs.  This degree of confusion is 
compounded by the early lack of leadership in the biotechnology industry.  By comparison, 
Shreveport’s Biomedical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana, established in 1986, 
succeeded in passing a property tax to fund the InterTech Science Park, a cluster built around 
Shreveport’s Charity Hospital and LSU Health Sciences Center, which now houses a biotech 
incubator.  The Foundation funnels substantial assets and resources to the park and, equally as 
important, provides leadership that has helped to advance completion of Shreveport’s Wet Lab 
Incubator facility. 
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In a third major initiative, using a $40 million bond financed by a new cigarette tax in 
2002, the state legislature created another partnership between LSUHSC-New Orleans and 
Tulane University HSC, the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium (LCRC), with the goal to 
create a medical and scientific center for cancer research that will be recognized as the state’s 
only National Cancer Institute (NCI)-Designated Cancer Center. The LCRC’s goals are to 
promote better health outcomes, to enhance research and education, and to provide economic 
diversity and career opportunities for Louisiana university graduates.  Beyond university 
research faculty support functions, the LCRC is planning and developing a 160,000 square-foot 
Cancer Research Center in New Orleans to provide shared core equipment and services with a 
projected financial impact of $350 million over five years (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 
29).  In March, 2005, the LCRC acquired the final piece of land for the caner center site, an 
undeveloped parcel near the existing medical district, with construction then scheduled to begin 
before the end of 2005 (LCRC 2005, 2). 
 Together, the BioInnovation Center, the LGTRC, and the LCRC, represent major 
investments in biosciences.  These institutions reflect an institutional approach to enhancing 
university research as an economic base, and the state’s investments of over $60 million, in a 
sense, reflect a linear conception of innovative growth along a “value chain” (BNOB Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005, 7).  Through the LGTRC and LCRC, the state hopes to recruit scientists and to 
acquire higher levels of research funds.  The BioInnovation Center, then, would boost the 
potential for successful commercialization technologies developed in universities and research 
centers – or converting basic research to applied research and retaining subsequent economic 
gains within the state and, more directly, within the New Orleans region.  However, as the 
literature review in this thesis suggested, successful biosciences bases depend on much more 
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than such soft and hard infrastructures to support a linear model of innovation.  The next section 
investigates the existence of a “local innovative milieu” from the perspective of the region’s 
capacity for entrepreneurship and employment in biosciences. 
 
Labor Force and Entrepreneurialism:  A Local Milieu for Innovation? 
 In 2002, New Orleans’ universities graduated 1,053 students in biotech-related fields, 
notching the region at 25th in the country in terms of total graduate output (BNOB Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005, 32).  Comparing this number against regions with similarly sized labor forces, 
New Orleans only trails the metropolitan areas of Raleigh-Durham and Austin.  Other parts of 
Louisiana generated approximately 950 biotech-related graduates in 2002.  Table 2 presents 
several location quotients and rankings culled from a GNO, Inc. biotech workforce evaluation in 
2005, and Table 3 presents a breakdown by university.  The metro area also ranks 23rd in terms 
of PhD graduates and 26th in terms of Professional-level graduates in biotech-related fields.  
These numbers suggest that, if New Orleans developed a substantial biosciences cluster, the 
region would be well positioned to provide the necessary skilled workforce, assuming a 
significant level of graduate retention.  
 Prior to Katrina, however, New Orleans’ biotech-related employment lagged significantly 
behind its output of an advanced workforce.  A 2004 survey of 20 firms in the New Orleans Area 
– constituting a majority of regional biotech employers11 – conducted for GNO, Inc. reported a 
total employment of about 900 workers, primarily laboratory technicians/technologists, research 
specialists, research scientists.  This number had grown steadily in the previous few years, 
tracking closely to employment growth reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and was  
                                                 
11 A 2004 study for GNO, Inc. estimated a total of 24 regional biotech firms (BNOB Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005, 36). 
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Table 2.  Biotech-related Graduates in Greater New Orleans Area 
 
Degree Level Bio Grads 
Location 
Quotient** Rank* 
Biology/Biological Sciences, 
General 
Bachelor 378 2.06 4 
Pharmacy Professional 107 1.04 26 
Chemistry, General Bachelor 82 2.04 10 
Cell/Cellular Biology and 
Anatomical Sciences 
Bachelor 68 10.19 7 
Epidemiology Master 67 21.70 3 
Biomedical/Medical Engineering Bachelor 38 6.20 9 
Clinical Lab. Science/Medical 
Technologist 
Bachelor 27 4.27 12 
Chemical Engineering Bachelor 23 .99 30 
Chemistry, General Ph. D. 21 1.96 9 
Cardiovascular 
Technology/Technologist 
Bachelor 21 123.51 1 
Biostatistics Master 18 38.11 1 
Neuroscience Bachelor 18 4.58 22 
Biochemistry Bachelor 18 1.17 73 
Cell/Cellular Biology and 
Anatomical Sciences 
Master 17 26.52 1 
Pharmacology Master 16 29.33 1 
Cell/Cellular Biology and 
Anatomical Sciences 
Ph. D. 12 9.28 3 
Biomedical/Medical Engineering Master 11 2.89 24 
 
 
SOURCE:  “Biotech Workforce Evaluation,” Greater New Orleans, Inc., 17 January 2005; 
retrieved October, 2006, from http://www.gnoinc.org. 
*Location Quotient is defined as the ratio of the local percentage of total graduates in biotech-
related fields to the national percentage of total graduates in biotech-related fields. 
**Blended rank based on absolute number ranking and percentage of total graduates ranking. 
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Table 3.  Largest Biotech-related Degree Programs in Greater New Orleans Area 
 
University 
Biotech-
related 
Graduates* 
Major Biotech-related 
Education Programs 
Major Areas of 
Bioscience Research 
LSUHSC 81 Biochemistry 
Cardiovascular Technology 
Clinical Laboratory Science 
Genetics 
Microbiology/Bacteriology 
Neuroscience 
Pathology 
 
Cancer 
Molecular and Human 
Genetics 
Neuroscience 
Oral and Craniofacial 
Biology 
Loyola 43 Biochemistry 
Chemistry 
 
 
Tulane 369 Cellular Biology 
Epidemiology 
Biomedical Engineering 
Chemical Engineering 
Neuroscience 
Biostatistics 
Biology 
Pharmacology 
Chemistry 
Biochemistry 
 
Bioenvironmental 
Research 
Cancer Cardiovascular 
Health 
Gene Therapy 
Genetics 
Infectious Disease 
Primate Research 
Tropical Medicine 
UNO 115 Biology 
Chemistry 
Cellular Biology 
Biomedical Engineering 
Biostatistics 
Conservation & Mollecular 
Genetics 
 
Bioinformatics 
Xavier 378 Biochemistry 
Biology 
Chemistry 
Pharmacy 
Bioenvironmental 
Research 
Clinical Science 
Pharmaceutical 
Science 
 
SOURCE: SOURCE:  Biotech Workforce Evaluation, Greater New Orleans, Inc., 17 January 
2005 (http://www.gnoinc.org) 
*Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), National Center for Education 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. 
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projected to continue to grow (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 36).  Most of the region’s 
20-plus biotech companies average between 3 and 5 employees, although two companies, 
Reliagene Technologies and Pam Lab, employ over 70 and 100 people, respectively (20).  Figure 
1 maps each of these 20 companies’ addresses as listed in the Bring Back New Orleans 
Commission’s Biosciences Workgroup Report (2006).  Of the 20 firms, 13 provided separate 
addresses.12  From a cursory look at the admittedly partial map, no physical clustering patterns 
are apparent with respect to intra-regional firm location, with firms situated variously throughout 
the area’s small-office landscape and not, for example, concentrated near the downtown medical 
district or in other nodes.  As Walcott describes in her work on biosciences industries in San 
Diego (2002) and Atlanta (1999), real estate is a central concern for biotech firms, alternately 
locating near university research centers or in peripheral suburban employment and residence 
nodes, depending on inter-firm and university linkages, the need to access incubator services, 
facility requirements determined by the firm’s stage in the development process, etc.  At this 
stage, New Orleans’ nascent industry does not appear to be significantly clustering around the 
downtown medical district or otherwise exhibiting spatial characteristics of agglomeration 
economies. 
 Aside from the hard spatial features of an innovative cluster, Louisiana has also 
traditionally lacked a strong culture of entrepreneurship.  This partly results from access to 
venture capital, which has historically been problematic and in short supply (BNOB Biosciences 
Workgroup 2005, 38).  Table 4 reports Louisiana’s rankings in utilizing two competitive 
government grant programs for small business’ wishing to commercialize technological 
innovations, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology  
                                                 
12 Four of the incorporated entities listed were located at the same address.  Others provided P.O. 
Boxes or no addresses. 
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Table 4.  SBIR and STTR Funding in Louisiana and Nation, 2000-2004 
 
 Year Louisiana Rank 
Total grant 
Money for State 
Total Federal Dollars 
Available 
Percent of 
Total 
 2000 42 $2.2M $1.1B 0.20% 
 2001 39 $3.9M $1.2B 0.26% 
SBIR 2002 40 $3.2M $1.5B 0.22% 
 2003 44 $3.4M $1.8B 0.13% 
 2004 45 $3.8M $2.0B 0.19% 
 2000 50 $0 $63K 0.00% 
 2001 37 $100K $62M 0.16% 
STTR 2002 50 $0 $95M 0.00% 
 2003 29 $599K $102M 0.59% 
 2004 47 $169K $209M 0.08% 
 
SOURCE:  SBA (http://www.sba.gov/sbir/index-sttr.html), reported in Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission, “Biosciences Workgroup Report,” 20 December 2005. 
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Transfer (SBTT) programs.  The developed high-tech environments of California and 
Massachusetts account for the majority of the funds, while only a small fraction accrues to low-
ranked states like Louisiana.  However, private sources account for considerably more 
investment than government programs, and private financing networks shape the locational 
tendencies of biotech areas.  Mindful of their investment portfolios, venture capital firms prefer 
the proximity and trust embedded in an innovative milieu.  In a sense, these linkages are 
“untraded interdependencies,” reflecting the importance of knowledge of not only the sort that is 
created and dispersed by researchers and educational institutions but also of the level of investor 
confidence and entrepreneurial know-how.   
 Private funding sources include two related categories of angel investors and venture 
capital.  Angel investors, usually wealthy individuals and/or successful entrepreneurs 
themselves, usually invest a few hundred thousand dollars in seed capital at an early stage and 
offer assistance in drafting a business plan, with the intention to help the young firm secure more 
stable sources of venture capital.  Angel investments are generally not considered significant in 
Louisiana, although recent groups have attempted to address the shortage.13  Likewise, the state 
has historically been deficient in access to venture capital, which the BNOB Biosciences 
Working Group (2006, 39) attributes to “a relative lack of community support for new 
technology companies, the lack of strong support for the spirit of entrepreneurship within the 
university environments, and weak leadership from the local finance community.”  Table 5 
shows that, in recent years, the state often receives less than one tenth of one percent of national 
venture capital investments.  Between 1990 and 2005, only two known biotech deals occurred in  
Louisiana, totaling $5 million (39).  Recently, the state has attempted to provide incentives for 
                                                 
13 Most notably, the Louisiana Angel Network has been established an attempt to increase 
awareness and to link potential investors with firms in need. 
 51 
Table 5.  Venture Capital Funding in Louisiana and Nation, 1996-2004 
 
 Number of Deals Total Investment ($Millions)  
Year Nation Louisiana Nation Louisiana Louisiana Share of Total Investment (%) 
1996 2465 3 10807.5 10.7 0.10 
1997 3083 9 14649.9 26.5 0.18 
1998 3555 8 20745.4 68.0 0.33 
1999 5396 9 53454.4 294.0 0.55 
2000 7812 14 104402.1 112.7 0.11 
2001 4464 10 40532.8 80.5 0.20 
2002 2610 6 21777.4 19.3 0.09 
2003 2409 1 19646.5 1.2 0.01 
2004 2566 3 22098.4 3.2 0.01 
2005 2637 3 22736.9 2.5 0.01 
2006 2277 2 19243.1 2.0 0.01 
 
SOURCE:  2006 PricewaterhouseCooper/Venture Economics/NVCA MoneyTree Survey, data 
current as of 18 October 2006; retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://www.pwcmoneytree.com. 
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 venture capital through tax credits on investments up to $1 million.  Meanwhile, three new 
venture capital funds – Louisiana Fund I, Louisiana Ventures, and the Louisiana Technology 
Fund – have been established within the state, while GNO, Inc. and the Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development have established the Capital Village to try to attract out-of-state venture 
capitalists to connect with in-state entrepreneurs. 
Even with recent attempts to address lagging investment, the dominant wisdom on 
biotech clusters and innovative environments in general shows that public funds, while important 
for strategically filling early-stage funding gaps for new firms, are no substitute for private 
investment.  Private investment depends critically on less quantifiable shortages, such as a 
lacking “spirit of entrepreneurship,” and consequently resists easy answers.  Moreover, New 
Orleans’ university strengths may address a pre-condition for a thriving biotech industry, but 
studies show that a research university is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for high-tech 
entrepreneurship.  In most biotech environments, a public agenda to support research 
commercialization has largely followed rather than led cluster formation.  These reasons 
certainly provide evidence to temper optimism for New Orleans’ attempt to fashion a biosciences 
base for economic development, despite recent initiatives to strategically enhance the university 
research agenda and provide an incubation infrastructure for fostering start-ups.  Rather, as 
described in earlier literature reviews, development depends on a whole host of other factors, 
including regional agglomeration as represented by economic diversity, a well-trained 
workforce, attractive infrastructure, access to venture capital, and a local climate of 
entrepreneurialism.  Of course, most scholarship on the highly concentrated biotech and 
biosciences-oriented economic development remains biased toward the best performing regions, 
partly because these areas display a new history of development, often in stages as the local 
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industry matures.  In New Orleans, on the other hand, according to Aaron Miscenich, director of 
the BioInnovation Center, “nothing really exists; there is no commercialization of products right 
now,” notwithstanding a handful of mostly very small businesses (Kral 2006).  As described in 
the next section on New Orleans’ post-Katrina environment, it seems unlikely that a major urban 
disaster would fit constructively into a future biotechnology success story. 
 
Post-Katrina Challenges and Opportunities  
 In the first year after Katrina, the New Orleans area Bio-Med industry, as defined above, 
has provided a major focus of post-Katrina recovery efforts.  Since the storm’s aftermath 
physically decimated health facilities and displaced care providers along with roughly half of the 
city’s total population, access to health care remains one of the most immediate issues in day-to-
day life and, along with housing supply and storm protection, a primary area of questions 
regarding whether New Orleans holds sufficient infrastructure to support large-scale 
repopulation.  Looking more toward economic recovery and growth, the Bio-Med industry 
remains targeted for efforts to diversify the city’s economic base.  While major planning efforts 
are currently underway, many uncertainties remain.  This section will assess damage to the city’s 
health care infrastructure and positioning as a regional center for life sciences R&D as they relate 
to a program for economic development.  Unquestionably, Hurricane Katrina and the recovery 
effort will dramatically reshape the future of the Bio-Med industry in general and the downtown 
medical complex in particular.  Accordingly, this section assesses the recovery status of New 
Orleans’ biomedical complex as an economic development project and, more generally, the 
implications of a concurrent attempt to rebuild the city’s health care infrastructure after Katrina.  
In the economic development framework sketched out by the Bring Back New Orleans 
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Commission, clusters remain at the heart of the concepts at work in the Bio-Med sectoral 
strategies: 
The Bio-Med industry is commonly thought to have a synergistic effect, causing the 
value of the combined industries to be more than the value of each individual component. 
Pre-Katrina, New Orleans had in place a bio-med district – a physical corridor where 
hospitals, medical schools and research facilities were concentrated.  The concept of a 
bio-med corridor or “district” is vital to the future of a health sciences industry in New 
Orleans because the success, recognition and growth of hospitals, medical schools, 
research facilities and emerging biotech companies are strongly interdependent (BNOB 
2006, 29). 
 
This passage underscores the importance of interdependency among institutions, firms, and 
universities, as well as the necessity of economic diversity arising from agglomeration 
economies.  However, the role of a compact, discretely bounded, physical district in an industry 
primarily sorted into the softer, more conceptual geographies of region-wide clusters remains 
unclear, especially since Katrina not only directly damaged the Bio-Med district but also 
severely impacted broader regional economic processes. 
 
Damage to the Foundations of the Bio-Med Industries 
 Attempts to describe the hurricane damages are prone to expiration, since the situation 
continues to change rapidly.  However, this section briefly describes the disaster’s impact as it 
relates to the New Orleans’ Bio-Med industry, highlighting the extent of challenges to building 
on pre-Katrina momentum in the biosciences field.  At the broadest level, Hurricane Katrina 
dramatically reduced New Orleans’ population from about 450,000 in 2000 to fewer than 
190,000 in summer 2006 (Louisiana Health and Population Survey 2006).14  More specifically, 
the storm dealt a crippling blow to the state’s biosciences institutions, damaging infrastructure 
                                                 
14 In disagreement with the household survey count of around 190,000, Mayor Nagin argues for 
a population estimate of around 230,000, based on earlier analyses of other numbers, such as 
utility use (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 27 September 2006). 
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and displacing employees at most of the region’s hospitals, medical schools, and research 
centers.  Lost revenue and, in some cases, declining student bodies forced massive restructuring 
of academic programs.  UNO’s fall 2006 enrollment stood at roughly two-thirds of pre-Katrina 
levels, and revenue shortfalls from lost student revenue and state-funding cutbacks, in addition to 
over $100 million in damages, forced 700 layoffs or furloughs of part-time or adjunct faculty and 
non-essential staff, several academic program reductions, and a halt to construction of a new 
biotech laboratory (BNOB 2006, 32-34).  Tulane’s losses exceeded $250 million, and the 
university has reduced faculty and staff by approximately one third since the storm (LRA 
2006a). Tulane University’s downtown institutions, including the School of Medicine and 
Tulane Hospital, have reopened in phases; but the school expects a significant budgetary 
shortfall for 2006 (BNOB 2006, 34).  Overall, as of January 2006, losses to universities included 
over 1800 faculty and staff, $223 million in revenue, and $367 million in faculty and staff 
salaries and benefits, a major blow to the entire urban economy (35).  Xavier, Tulane, UNO, and 
LSUHSC all suffered massive damage to their biosciences research facilities, fracturing the hard 
infrastructural support for the local knowledge base required to support innovation. 
 Another major event has been the decimation of the city’s health care system, as several 
area hospitals have closed.  Figure 1 compares the locations of hospitals before Katrina with 
open facilities as of October 2006.  Consequently, access to health care remains one of the 
central preoccupations of the recovery effort.  Charity Hospital, one of the nation’s oldest 
medical institutions most recently under the administration of LSUHSC, represents the most 
notable closure.  LSUHSC furloughed 2,600 workers at Medical Center of Louisiana-New 
Orleans (MCLNO, which includes Charity and University hospitals) after the storm, and the 
future extent of LSUHSC’s presence in the regional health care system remains undecided.  
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Charity Hospital, in particular, has long served as an enticing location for medical residencies, 
playing an important role in recruiting care providers to the regional health care system.  In any 
case, losses to local educational, research, and clinical programs will likely continue to disrupt 
the flow of research funding and hinder the ability of local medical schools to attract post-
graduate residents, further undermining their ability to compete for clinical and research funding 
and faculty.  Additionally, the availability of funding for LSU and Tulane’s graduate medical 
education (GME) programs through clinical practice, such as Medicare reimbursements from 
hospitals to universities, remains in a state of flux.  At the same time, the burden of 
uncompensated care traditionally handled through the Charity System has shifted to the area’s 
private hospitals. 
 Hurricane Katrina further delayed construction of the BioInnovation Center and its 
component GMP facility for the LGTRC.  While the site remains prepared for construction, 
higher construction costs have increased the facility’s price by an estimated $20 million, which 
may result in a redesign of the center.  The storm also interrupted the bond financing mechanism 
for the LCRC facility, now expected to require an additional $70 million, and postponed the start 
of construction (LCRC 2005, 3. 
 Perhaps the most substantial hurricane impact as it pertains to biotechnology-based 
economic development involves broad quality of life issues.  From the health care system to the 
school system, from infrastructure damages to the loss of residents and businesses, from 
increasing utility costs to lingering questions about the levee system’s ability to guard against 
another major storm surge event, New Orleans remains in a state of upheaval more than one year 
after Katrina.  In virtually all cases, quality of life has proven to be a more important component 
of attracting and retaining a skilled workforce for innovative industries than more quantifiable 
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and controllable variables, such as tax incentives, incubator facilities, and cutting edge research.  
With respect to quality of life, New Orleans likely will remain uncompetitive for the short-to-
medium term even in the best-case recovery scenario.  Nevertheless, as reviewed in the next 
section, several post-hurricane initiatives stand to shape the future of the Bio-Med industries in 
the Greater New Orleans Area. 
 
General and Biosciences-specific Planning Projects Since the Storm 
 As the initial disaster response subsided, funding and planning the recovery and 
rebuilding effort emerged as a central issue.  In some ways, the recovery political economy acts 
through a substantially altered calculus for decision-making, with competition between the 
agendas of separate public agencies and private interests occurring at federal, state, regional, and 
local levels.  At the same time, while the hurricane-affected areas suffered massive damage to 
real estate, infrastructure, private industry, and human capital, the state holds the balance of 
discretion over spending large sums of federal money for redevelopment.  Often, tensions have 
arisen between the desire to rebuild what existed before the storm and the notion that the effected 
areas, New Orleans in particular, should rebound into a more economically and environmentally 
sustainable – in other words, smaller – landscape.  Of course, the boundaries of these competing 
visions are subject to interpretation and, thus, disagreement, especially with the rebuilding 
project’s immensely unprecedented scope.  In many ways, the expression of these tensions 
hearkens back to a history of political antagonism between the city of New Orleans and the state 
at large.  While a complete account of post-Katrina planning efforts is well beyond the scope of 
this section, a brief summary of planning efforts relating to the biosciences and health care 
introduces new challenges and opportunities for change in the post-Katrina environment. 
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 The federal government has provided recovery funds primarily through flexible 
Community Development Block Grants, to be spent at the discretion of the state government.  
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has also provided loans targeted to reestablishing 
local businesses.  Meanwhile, Congress responded with the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GO 
Zone) to provide substantial incentives for businesses in the effected areas.  The federal 
government has exerted influence through Gulf Coast Recovery Czar Donald Powell and in the 
realm of health care though Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt. 
At the state level, Governor Kathleen Blanco established the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority to direct the spending of hurricane recovery funds.  The LRA’s decisions, currently in 
the task force committee process, must also receive federal approval.  The Road Home grant 
program for housing renovations remains the LRA’s highest-profile program, but its committees 
are considering nearly every type of hurricane recovery initiative.  In October 2006, the 
Recovery Workforce Training Program, organized by the LRA and other state-level economic 
development agencies with $38 million in CDBD funds, began accepting applications from 
regional workforce intermediary organizations to train workers to match high demand in key 
sectors, including health care and construction (LRA 2006b).   
At the local level, several massive planning efforts have sought to guide future 
redevelopment, under the direction of the mayor, the city council, and most recently through the 
Unified New Orleans Plan.  Offering perhaps the most prominent effort, especially during a 
reelection campaign, Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB) released 
final reports in January 2006, with the aim of guiding requests for funding from the LRA and 
Congress.  This thesis has relied heavily on the BNOB report on economic development.  Even 
more specifically, the BNOB Technology Subcommittee Biosciences Workgroup Report, 
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released separately from the comprehensive final BNOB report, provides the most current 
available assessment of the industry and compares favorably with pre-Katrina reports, such as 
the rosier BDRP plan, with respect to its attempts to strategically address the complexity of 
regional biotechnology industries and the extent of obstacles facing implementation.15  
Potentially, the process of constructing this report through the Technology Subcommittee could 
lay the basis for future collaboration toward building the effective leadership structures that have 
proven necessary to support biotech clusters in other locales, especially as the BioInnovation 
Center finally approaches completion.  In comparison to the Biosciences Workgroup Report, the 
BNOB’s economic development report on the Bio-Med industry – which drew on the 
Biosciences Workgroup in combination with reports on the health care industry – suffers from 
the common tendency to engage flexible definitions of terms like “biomedical,” “biosciences,” 
and “biotechnology” on the local level (Cortright and Mayer 2002).  More recently, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce has provided the New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (RPC) 
with a $300,000 grant to formally assess the regional biotechnology and biosciences industries 
and to recommend a strategy for catching up not only with other parts of the nation but with the 
more advanced initiatives in Shreveport and Baton Rouge.  Due for completion in Spring 2007, 
the RPC study and the process involved in its creation could lead to a more coordinated activist 
leadership structure for the local industry.  
Finally, the state has attempted to use Katrina’s decimation of the essential health care 
infrastructure as an opportunity to plan a new health care system for the New Orleans region.  
The next section summarizes this restructuring effort, with particular attention to the competing 
agendas of various regional, state, and federal entities shaping the process.  Ultimately, these 
                                                 
15 Admirably, the Biosciences Workgroup also includes a note of clarification regarding the 
common pitfalls arising from vague definitions. 
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efforts have drastic implications for the Bio-Med industry in general and, by extension, for New 
Orleans’ attempts to foster biosciences and biotechnology as a base for economic development.   
 
Restructuring Regional Health Care After Katrina 
 As of Fall 2006, the effort to restructure New Orleans’ health care system has gained 
significant traction and stands to reshape the future of graduate medical education and 
employment in the largest category of jobs included in the regional Bio-Med industries.  US 
Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt has prominently advocated for a 
reforming a system that was “fraught with inefficiency” long before Katrina decimated its 
physical and human infrastructure (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 18 July 2006).  Critics-
turned-reformers frequently point to the existence of a “two-tiered” system of health care in 
Louisiana, where low-income populations direct the vast majority of Medicaid and indigent 
dollars to the antiquated state-run Charity system while middle- and upper-income populations 
direct private insurance and Medicare dollars to private hospitals and primary care clinics, which 
habitually provide a relatively poor quality of care at high per-unit costs when compared against 
national benchmarks for private facilities (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006).  Similarly, crowding 
has historically characterized public-sector facilities, most notably in the case of low-income 
New Orleanians’ traditional reliance on Charity’s emergency rooms for primary care, while 
private-sector beds have remained underutilized.  At the state level, Louisiana routinely ranks 
near the bottom of national public health ratings, including the extent of insurance coverage.  A 
report by Pricewaterhouse Coopers commissioned by the LRA locates much of the statewide 
inadequacy on the supply-side with medical workforce characteristics.  In 2003, Louisiana had 
11,000 unfilled statewide healthcare openings (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006, 99).  With 
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respect to MDs, New Orleans’ region (Region 1) held by far the state’s highest physician to 
population ratio, especially for specialty physicians.16  According to this report, high specialty 
physician concentrations in New Orleans (Region 1), Baton Rouge (Region 2), and Shreveport 
(Region 9) have distorted statewide levels, masking a shortage of specialty physicians in other 
more rural regions and a shortage of primary care providers throughout the state.  Allied Health 
professionals display similar patterns.  These spatial inconsistencies likely owe to the location of 
teaching institutions, teaching hospitals and medical schools in particular, and the tendency for 
medical providers, residents, and skilled medical workforce to agglomerate in a given locality for 
reasons relating to institutions, local market determinants of supply and demand for services, and 
path dependence – in other words, reasons not entirely dissimilar to the biotech cluster model 
examined above or any other type of agglomerative economic activity.  Moreover, the example is 
important in that it demonstrates competing priorities among agencies charged with guiding the 
recovery and reform of Louisiana’s health care system.  When observing a concentration of 
physician specialists and Allied Health professionals, local economic development interests 
might discern competitive advantage as a regionally prestigious health center; but as the 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers report reflects, health care advocates might perceive inefficiency and 
spatial inequity within a system primarily organized at the state level.  Unquestionably, this 
dynamic will shape the Bio-Med industry in the New Orleans Area as well as more specific 
efforts to cultivate the downtown medical cluster.  New Orleans houses two of the state’s three 
medical schools (LSUHSC and TUHSC) as well as several other institutions ranging from nurse 
training to technician programs that provide the vast majority of the region’s skilled medical 
workforce, in addition to their capacities in biosciences-related research. 
                                                 
16 The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) defines Region 1 as Orleans, 
Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. 
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Two major projects are underway to dramatically reshape access to health care in New 
Orleans.  An early draft of the LRA-sponsored Pricewaterhouse Coopers report claimed an 
“overbuilt” public health infrastructure in the New Orleans region and proposed scaling-back 
LSU’s involvement, casting doubt over the revitalization of the downtown medical cluster 
(Times Picayune [New Orleans], 25 April 2006).   At the same time, the LSU-run Charity 
Hospital has habitually provided primary care for the city’s uninsured; and its closure has 
scattered medical services to private clinics and hospitals where uncompensated care has risen 86 
percent, even as many health care practitioners have left the city (Times Picayune [New 
Orleans], 5 June 2006).  Claiming irreparable damage to Charity Hospital and seizing the 
opportunity to finance a state-of-the-art clinical and teaching facility to meet current standards, 
LSU has partnered with the federal Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to propose a new joint 
medical complex to replace both institutions’ downtown hospitals at an estimated cost of  $1.2 
billion, with Governor Blanco voicing support (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 20 June 2006).  
Roles intended for the complex near the existing downtown medical district include conducting 
research, training medical students and residents, and treating uninsured patients who, before 
Katrina, would have gone to Charity Hospital.  The federal share of financing, over $630 million 
on the part of the VA, has already been appropriated by Congress; and LSUHSC is seeking to 
finance their roughly $650 million share through a combination of grants from CDBG recovery 
funds, reimbursements from insurance and FEMA for damage to Charity and University 
Hospitals,17 and loans and bonds to be retired through patient revenues.  Sufficient revenue, 
however, depends on the hospital’s ability to attract more paying patients than the pre-Katrina 
version of LSU’s hospital system, where only 56 percent can pay for care through Medicare, 
                                                 
17 FEMA initially estimated damage to Charity at $27 million, while LSU claims well over $100 
million. 
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Medicaid, or private insurance.  In an October hearing of the LRA health care and infrastructure 
committees, committee members voiced skepticism regarding the need for an expensive new 
facility in an area “over-bedded” even before Katrina’s massive population loss, especially 
where the Charity and University hospital sites and their 551 combined beds would be left vacant 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006).  Leery of long term financing risks, the state legislature has 
also questioned the merits of the project.  LSUHSC, on the other hand, envisions their proposed 
350-bed hospital as a location for specialty services and a partial answer to the gap left by 
Charity’s closure.  LSUHSC also cites the importance of such facilities for maintaining 
institutional prestige for research and clinical programs and for attracting residents to fulfill the 
LSU’s role in the state health care system as the primary provider of graduate medical education.  
Further, the complex could deliver massive repercussions throughout the local economy.  
Initially, construction could generate as many as 19,000 jobs with a $2 billion impact, and the 
complex could employ about 6,000 full-time workers, with an annual impact of $1.2 billion 
following expected completion in 2012 (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 2 November 2006).  At 
the time of this writing, the future of the proposed LSU facility remains uncertain.  Nonetheless, 
the final result will certainly shape the downtown medical cluster.  The proposed facility could 
potentially provide urban infill in a large, undeveloped tract immediately adjacent to the existing 
downtown medical complex.  Along with the BioInnovation Center’s completion, a new LSU 
hospital could push the Bio-Med industries to the forefront of efforts to redevelop a portion of 
downtown, specifically the area around upper Canal Street, largely excluded from development 
in recent decades.  Long viewed as an obstacle to redevelopment, the nearby Iberville housing 
project has been slated for eventual demolition, which likely would coincide with the proposed 
expansion of the medical district.  Of course, this path of redevelopment raises distributional 
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issues, since public housing and public health care facilities are slated for removal, threatening 
two major sites providing not only safety-net services but entire, historically entrenched social 
infrastructures for low-income residents. 
Ultimately, the state’s support for the new complex also depends on a second major 
planning effort currently underway for a federally supported health care system and insurance 
pilot project.  Spearheaded by US Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt and 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) Secretary Fred Cerise, the directors of the 
pilot project have expressed high hopes that the future New Orleans health care system will serve 
as a model for the state and the nation.  Leavitt has been particularly vocal, offering staff to assist 
in the planning phase and a willingness to accommodate the transition through a flexible 
application of federal Medicare and Medicaid rules and funds, provided that the new system 
dramatically breaks from the old to focus more on patients and less on institutions while 
achieving cost-savings in the long run (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 18 July 2006).  On 
October 20th, the Health Care Redesign Collaborative released a concept paper for review by 
state legislature, the LRA, Leavitt’s office, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), each of which would play a role in funding the ambitious project.  In spelling out a pilot 
project for Region 1 reform – eventually intended to expand statewide – the concept paper 
generally echoes the earlier LRA-sponsored Pricewaterhouse Coopers report, which criticizes the 
existing “two-tiered” system characterized by a shortage of beds in the public-sector and a 
surplus in the private-sector beds.  Moreover, Leavitt, the LRA, and the BNOB plans all 
generally reflect a similar rhetoric for New Orleans health care as a more patient-centric system 
where the large institution model historically epitomized by Charity Hospital is replaced by a 
more decentralized, community-based primary and preventive care centers, which the Redesign 
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Collaborative calls a “medical homes” model (Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative 
2006).  In the proposed system, the high cost of expanding insurance to low-income individuals 
who do not qualify for Medicaid (generally, those earning less than 200 percent of the Federal 
poverty level) is balanced by cost savings from access to a managed-care network of public and 
private “medical homes” and hospitals with more flexible application of Medicare and Medicaid 
coverage.  In accordance with the dominant paradigm of public health practice, the new system 
will place additional emphasis on preventive care, health education, and public-private 
partnerships across a range of regional provider networks (including hospitals, public health 
units, and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs)) to ensure access to care.   
However, at least two major challenges stand in the way of implementing such a bold 
agenda for reform.  First, from newspaper editorials to Health Secretary Leavitt’s cautionary 
warnings against “individual and corporate interests” allowing the failing of implementation of 
fundamental systemic changes, many reform-minded individuals fear opposition from interests 
representing the old system with firmly entrenched power in the state legislature (Daily 
Advertiser [Lafayette], 21 July 2006).  Many reformers attribute the system’s faults to the 
inefficiency and inertia of “Big” Charity – a sort of double entendre referring both to the size of 
Charity’s New Orleans high-rise building and to the resistance to reform of the massive Charity 
System, an institution dating back over 250 years and only lately run by LSUHSC.  On the other 
hand, if the Charity System finally unravels and LSUHSC’s new facility emerges as a more 
specialty-driven hospital, failure to effectively extend coverage through the “medical homes” 
model could result in a permanent loss of the safety net for low-income health care.  
Additionally, if the pilot project fails to dissolve the “two-tiered” distinction, the state could 
struggle with paying down debts on the proposed facility.   
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Even before the current planning phase, the pilot project was scaled down from a 
statewide initiative to focus solely on the New Orleans region.  As sketched out in the Redesign 
Collaborative concept paper, the pilot program for expanding insurance coverage to 80 percent 
of Region 1’s 127,000 uninsured residents in the first five years will cost an estimated $383 
million – $1 billion if the program expands statewide in the future.  Michael Leavitt’s office, 
however, has been vague regarding whether the federal level of commitment to regulatory 
flexibility will extend to include additional funding.  On the other hand, the more decentralized 
vision for the future will likely dramatically alter the local model for health services 
employment.  The “medical homes” model proposes a network of primary care centers 
geographically dispersed throughout the region, suggesting a decreased role for the traditional 
downtown medical district.  Instead, neighborhood- and community-situated health units would 
deliver relatively more care and employ more workers, shifting the health care employment 
paradigm away from large institutions and toward smaller enterprises.  
Workforce development provides a second major challenge, albeit one thus far receiving 
significantly less attention than related proposals for massive investments in physical health care 
infrastructure and insurance reform currently on the table.  The Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006, 
98) report, probably the most extensive current study on the medical workforce, recommends a 
more even statewide distribution of medical residents according to population, which would 
reinforce the dearth of residency positions currently available in New Orleans’ decimated GME 
infrastructure.  Within the New Orleans Region, the placement of residents would decentralize as 
private hospitals and community-based primary care centers take on additional residency 
positions.  For nurses, the report recommends more comprehensive career ladder programs with 
stronger incentives to graduate LPNs to RNs, a more skilled position in greater demand, as an 
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immediate opportunity to address existing workforce shortages (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006, 
19, 98, 113).  Fitzgerald (2006, 55-57) nominates such strategies as sound health and economic 
policy, but notes that in practice health care career ladder programs remain structurally hampered 
by characteristics of federal Medicare/Medicaid funding and by inadequate state investment in 
community colleges.  Tulane HSC and LSUHSC leadership have voiced similar concerns with 
the structural inefficiencies built into the way hospitals and universities share federal funds, 
especially during the current phase post-Katrina upheaval.  With the LRA’s recent agreement to 
use $38 million of the CDBG money for workforce development programs, there exists an 
opportunity to marry health care workforce programs in Allied Health fields and supporting 
occupations to the region’s remodeled health care agenda. 
On the whole, however, workforce development remains a major weakness of past Bio-
Med initiatives, both in the field of health care and in more recent attempts to stimulate the 
biotechnology industry.  Even in otherwise successful cases of biotechnology sectoral strategies, 
a gap in workforce programs can serve as a weak link.18  While the LRA’s funding for statewide 
programs shows promise, its impact on New Orleans is far less clear than even the health care 
planning effort at the time of this writing.  Workforce development, along with a lack of 
effective leadership in biotechnology initiatives, thus remains a proximate weakness in New 
Orleans’ Bio-Med sectoral strategies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Fitzgerald and Leigh nominate workforce development as the major shortcoming in New 
Haven’s biosciences initiatives built around Yale University. 
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Conclusion:  The Complex Process of Planning Economic Growth in a Recovering 
Environment 
 
 With recent forays into fostering biotechnology and biosciences within the New Orleans 
region laid out, several points give significant cause for skepticism regarding the potential for 
biotechnology to provide the answer for regional economic diversification.  First, given the high 
degree of concentration in the biotechnology industry, it is unclear whether the industry will 
serve as a major economic project in most regions, especially in marginal areas like New 
Orleans.  Even in the top tier of biotech regions, the industry has a relatively small impact on the 
overall regional economy (Cortright and Mayer 2002); and biomanufacturing, perhaps the 
segment of the industry most capable of generating basic employment for workers without an 
advanced level of education, remains even more concentrated (Fitzgerald 2006).  On the other 
hand, as the industry continues to grow and to evolve, its changing spatial arrangements will 
likely allow additional regions to participate at a higher absolute level, even if the vast majority 
of investment remains relatively concentrated in a few regions.  In this respect, New Orleans has 
many competitors; but building on existing initiatives, such as the BioInnovation Center, may 
allow New Orleans to capture marginal gains from the biotech industry’s maturity process.  Still, 
committing additional resources without more significant efforts to study and to coordinate an 
agenda on the local level remains a dubious prospect with uncertain results. 
 Second, numerous state and local governments have adopted biotechnology as a focus of 
economic development strategies in recent years.  Like the cluster rhetoric through which 
biotechnology is often understood, faddism and the simple fact that nearly all significantly 
urbanized areas contain some component of a potential biotechnology cluster (e.g., research 
universities or medical institutions) likely account for some of the popularity.  As research on 
innovative landscapes suggests, biotechnology firms depend critically on a rare assortment of 
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local conditions, a “competitive cluster” or an “innovative milieu,” and likely will not respond to 
traditional recruitment and retention programs, such as tax incentives and subsidies.  Instead, 
state and local governments have adopted place-based and institutional approaches, such as 
science parks, biotechnology incubators, and commercialization programs for universities that 
most directly benefit extremely high-skilled workers.  Even before Katrina, similar efforts in 
New Orleans were in many respects behind the curve set by many other peripheral biosciences 
locales, including smaller regions within the state.  Additionally, such strategies demand a high 
rate of subsidy per directly created job (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 64).  As is the case in 
downtown New Orleans, physical investments are more driven by downtown redevelopment 
than by efforts to create an infrastructure for regional innovation.  Thus, both the place-based and 
human components of biotechnology strategies often offer little direct benefit to those most in 
need.  Workforce development and associates-degree and certificate training programs offer a 
possible answer to this shortcoming but usually receive much less attention and rely indirectly on 
the uncertain success of top-down efforts to foster commercialization suitable to generate 
demand for a sector-specific labor force.  In many cases, biotech firms remain skeptical of 
workers with minimum-required levels of training, such as associates degree or certificate 
programs; and although several instances of programs tailored to meet biotech demand for labor 
have started to change this bias in certain regions, biotech jobs may simply end up being too 
much of a stretch for underserved groups (Fitzgerald 2006, 148).  Even with successful 
commercialization, biotech firms characteristically operate through interregional linkages at least 
as much as through intraregional linkages.  Thus, much of the direct, indirect, and induced 
economic impact from a successful strategy leaves the constituent locale.   
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Third, while biotechnology strategies have gathered momentum on the state level, to this 
point, the region has lacked a key leadership and advocacy structure, either in the form of a “role 
model” firm or through the efforts of an effective, locally oriented industry organization to 
facilitate networking and lobbying on the behalf of regional firms.  Research has demonstrated 
that such structures, especially in the most recently emerging biotechnology centers, have served 
an important role in cluster formation (Walcott 1999; Walcott 2002; Huag and Ness 1993).  In 
contrast, major state- and university-policies, like biotech incubators, have often followed rather 
than led the initial formation of biotech commercialization by small- to medium-sized enterprises 
in the best performing regions. 
 Finally, New Orleans has traditionally displayed a relatively weak local culture for 
innovative entrepreneurship, as demonstrated by relatively small receipts of private and federal 
sources of venture capital and a relatively late installation of state venture capital funds.  Further, 
with Katrina wrecking havoc on any attempt to promote “quality of life” in New Orleans, the 
region is poorly positioned with respect to one of the main ingredients of an innovative 
environment.  New Orleans’ primary strength – its medical and biosciences research institutions 
– does not, in itself, constitute a suitable basis for fostering an innovative, entrepreneurial cluster, 
even before accounting for institutional losses suffered from Katrina. 
 As the BRDP plan states, perhaps the most significant outcome from recent initiatives is 
primarily symbolic:  “By investing a relatively small amount of money to implement the BRDP 
and its associated wet lab incubator facility, we can drive a stake into the ground and put up a 
sign that says ‘Louisiana:  Open for Business’” (BDRP 2002, 18).  Other recent documents, have 
warned against the perils of inaction, as if failing to facilitate local bioscience commercialization 
and to participate in the ongoing global evolution of the biotechnology industry would “kill the 
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goose that lays the golden egg” (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 1; BNOB 2006, 45).  
However, the globally footloose nature of the industry, still marked by the process of 
concentration into top regions, implies that, even if sectoral strategies and university 
enhancement policies can entice the goose to New Orleans, it may lay its egg elsewhere.   
 Although the BNOB Commission’s “Bio-Med” category is poorly defined and somewhat 
deceptively inclusive, this thesis has attempted to dig deeper into the conceptual merging of the 
existing health care industry with the biotechnology industry, a more attractive category for 
economic developers both with modest hopes to increase employment diversity and investment 
and with loftier ambitions to play midwife in the development of a high-tech cluster.  While 
expecting biotechnology to provide massive direct economic impacts in the New Orleans region 
may be unrealistic, prior to Katrina, health care already provided the largest source of payroll 
expenditure and, after the tourism industry, the second largest source of employment (BNOB 
2006, 30).  Today, trailing only construction, the health care industry accounts for 32 percent of 
total occupational demand in the Katrina Recovery Region requiring two years of training or less 
(Brady 2006).  Looking more toward the long term, the magnitude of reform slated for the 
regional health care system presents a significant opportunity to merge workforce development 
with public health policy goals, thus improving employment opportunities for underserved 
populations and advancing health care quality outcomes.  Looking broadly at the Bio-Med 
industries, this thesis has advanced the notion that rebuilding the health care system might 
provide a more practical direction for sectoral strategies than fostering a biotechnology industry.   
 However, a complex political economy dominated by competing policy priorities and 
interests has shaped the New Orleans’ Bio-Med industries in recent years.  In the current post-
Katrina rebuilding phase, an exceptionally diverse range of recovery initiatives competes for 
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resources in an uncertain fiscal climate, with the balance of decision-making and funding power 
existing at the federal and state levels.  At the focal point of this process, New Orleans has been 
characterized as a “nonregime” environment, lacking an understood agenda, depending on issue-
based coalitions rather than more permanent governing arrangements, and ineffectively targeting 
resources in the absence of a scheme of cooperation (Burns and Thomas 2006).  Although 
Hurricane Katrina placed unprecedented stresses onto a system poorly prepared to handle them, a 
recent slate of planning processes provides an opportunity to unify an agenda for change – or to 
further fragment and antagonize the decision-making process.  The Bio-Med industries exist in 
an arena marked by enormous skepticism from all sides, owing mainly to the high stakes and 
high level of investment involved, but also by partially intersecting visions for change across 
policymaking groups with a stake in the industry, including economic development, health care, 
downtown development, and universities.  Spread across various scales of governance, these 
segmented agendas also frequently diverge conceptually at the level of professional 
competencies and policy priorities.  Greater cross-pollenization and coordination of efforts 
among various policy and planning initiatives with implications for the Bio-Med industries not 
only could present a more unified front for the distribution of disaster funds but also could lead 
to alternative responses to ongoing challenges. 
 Investing in human capital to support the health care industry certainly appears to be a 
practical course of action, since health care occupations account for the largest, most established, 
and most in-demand component of the regional Bio-Med industries.  Lending a broader context 
to this assertion, Markusen (2004) presents a case for occupational targeting in addition to 
industrial targeting, especially in contemporary economies where workers, firms, and industrial 
geographical arrangements offer declining levels of long-term commitment to localities.  She 
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recommends targeting occupations that appear to be “(1) be highly skilled, (2) show growth 
potential, (3) cluster spatially, (4) cross-fertilize with other sectors, (5) encourage 
entrepreneurship, and (6) match the potential of the areas workforce” (Markusen 2004, 266).  
Health care occupations not only meet each of these criteria but also account for a massive share 
of the regional economy (68,664 jobs pre-Katrina) and the vast majority of employment in the 
Bio-Med sector (94.6 percent) (BNOB 2006, 30).  Unlike manufacturing or high-tech industries, 
primary health care provides a stable source of inherently local demand, much of which is 
financed at the federal level, while specialty care may generate income from outside the region.  
Moreover, the industry has trended upward in recent decades.  Between 1970 and 2001, health 
care consumption doubled to 14 percent of U.S. GDP; and this number is expected to rise to 17 
percent by 2011 (DeVol and Koepp 2003, 1).  Many of these jobs are attainable for lower-skilled 
workers.  While graduate medical education is an important component of regional health care 
systems, several additional medical workforce components require significantly less training, 
including a variety of health care support occupations and allied health professions.  Fitzgerald 
(2006, 57) highlights widespread shortages in Registered Nurses, nurse’s aids, and other health 
care paraprofessionals and emphasizes the conduciveness of these occupations to career ladders.  
However, despite successes in a few pilot projects, job ladder and training initiatives face a 
shortage of funding for relevant community college programs at the state level, even as federal 
policy (Medicare and Medicaid) structurally regulates that many of these high-stress, below-
minimum wage occupations are governed simultaneously by high demand and “cost 
containment” guidelines (55-56).   
 In the Hurricane Katrina-effected area, however, the LRA has already set aside $38 
million that can be used for workforce training in the health care sector.  If the Region 1 Health 
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Care Redesign Collaborative’s recommendations go into effect, the “medical homes” network 
for delivering services will demand a decentralized staffing model for a wide range of health care 
occupations, the precise organization of which is unclear at this point; and the Collaborative’s 
proposals for extending insurance coverage will likely increase the initial demand for a wide 
range of medical services, assuming that expanded networks of health care succeed in capturing 
a larger segment of the population.  However, while asking for $120 million for income 
guarantees and incentives for doctors, dentists, psychiatrists, RNs, and licensed professional 
staff, the concept paper makes little mention of workforce development for health care support 
occupations at the lower end of the spectrum (Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative 
2006).   
As a preliminary framework, the concept paper illustrates that, in practice, health care 
policymakers typically engage workforce development and job creation (typically 
preoccupations of the economic development field) as a secondary considerations.19  With the 
exception of higher-end GME programs, demand has primarily determined considerations for the 
health care workforce.  In contrast, supply-side approaches, such as occupational targeting and 
strategic career ladder programs for health professionals and support occupations, could begin to 
fill existing structural medical workforce gaps.  As a result, a more workforce-oriented 
perspective could help to unify and mutually advance both roles of the Bio-Med industry:  to 
staff a system for delivering health care services and to provide a source of jobs and economic 
growth.  By this reasoning, investing in human capital would emerge as a primary concern for 
                                                 
19 For another example, LSUHSC has responded to the LRA and legislature’s skepticism over 
the proposed new hospital in downtown New Orleans by adding claims of massive economic 
impacts to the hospital’s envisioned role in the health care and graduate medical education 
systems, while arguably glossing over initial questions regarding the need for an expensive new 
hospital to serve a smaller post-Katrina region. 
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health care reform.  For their part, economic developers and economic geographers have made 
little attempt to render the widely recognized contributions of health care to the regional 
economy explicit.  Similarly, this thesis has focused mainly on biosciences and biotechnology 
and, more specifically, how economic development theory and practice gravitates to such high-
tech industries; but health care occupations in some cases may provide a more realistic, more 
tangible alternative target for Bio-Med economic policies.  Additional research should further 
articulate the regional structures and impacts of health care, placing the industry and its 
workforce in a more refined economic context than its relative absence from the literature would 
suggest.  
In contrast, spatially concerned economic disciplines have more extensively considered 
biotechnology and other high-tech industries, but the precise workings of such clusters remain 
under-expressed.  This literature somewhat understandably has paid relatively little attention to 
the trajectories of marginal areas like New Orleans.  The radically unsettled landscape of post-
Katrina New Orleans is certainly not an ideal laboratory for investigating the empirical 
mechanisms of cluster formation.  Rather, this thesis has focused on the structural and discursive 
components of policy formation, particularly the institutions, political entities, and definitions 
that mediate the conceptualization of biotechnology and health care in sectoral strategies.  In this 
respect, New Orleans serves as an apt window into the piecemeal mobilization of ambiguous 
cluster concepts, as well as the politically and economically constrained strategies that follow.  
Future research and policy should further attempt to unpack the assumed linkages internal and 
external to the diversely constituted Bio-Med category and should strive for more 
comprehensive, more closely aligned approaches to health and economic policies. 
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